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ABSTRACT 
Based on multiple case studies of the transactions in China by private equity funds, 
this paper attempts to explore the value-creation capabilities of private equity funds at 
the transaction/deal level.  
Previous studies on financial performance of PE funds utilized data collected from 
publically traded companies in European/US markets.  By measuring financial 
performance of both “pre- and post-transactions,” these studies researched two 
questions: 1) Do buyout funds create value? 2) If they do, what are the sources of value 
creation?  In general, studies conclude that private equity/buyout funds do create value 
at both the deal level and investor level.  They also identified four possible sources of 
such value creation: 1) undervaluation, 2) leverage effect, 3) better governance, and 4) 
operational improvement. 
However, relatively little is known about the process of value creation.  In this 
study, I attempt to fill that gap, revealing the “secret recipe” of value creation.  
By carefully looking into the process of value creation, this study suggests five 
propositions covering capabilities at 1) deal selection/screening, 2) deal structuring, 3) 
operational improvement, 4) investment exit, and 5) Top Management Team (TMT).  
These capabilities at private equity/buyout funds are critical factors for value creation. 
In a thorough review of the value-creation process, this paper hopes to:  
1) Share real-life experiences and lessons learned on private equity transactions in
China as a developing economy. 
2) Reveal the process of deal/transaction to observe measures taken place within
deal/transaction for value creation. 
ii 
3) Show how well-executed strategies and capabilities in deal selection/screening,
deal structuring, operational improvement, and investment exit can still create value for 
private equity firms without financial leverage. 
4) Share the experience of State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) reform participated in
by private equity firms in China.  This could provide valuable information for policy 
makers in China.  
iii 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research Background 
1.1.1 Rapid Growth and Expansion of Private Equity Industry 
Buyout funds, as a major part of the private equity (PE) fund industry, are funds 
that primarily invest in privately held companies by acquiring a controlling equity stake.  
The popular investment strategies for buyout funds include: standalone (non add-on) 
and add-on acquisition.  Often times, these transactions are structured as leverage 
buyouts, which deploy a fair amount of debt in financing the transaction.  
PitchBook, a publication focused on US middle-market private equity funds, 
including buyout, growth capital, and mezzanine capital funds, published the following 
data as shown in tables 1 & 2, such as the number of transactions closed and percentage 
of debt used in the transactions during the period of 2000-2011. 
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Table 1 Deal Activities (2000-2011) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
# of standalone deals 426 322 417 625 860 983 1,189 1,363 942 519 712 660 
% of deals closed 60% 62% 67% 65% 65% 61% 59% 56% 56% 54% 53% 50% 
# of add-on deals 284 198 209 333 468 638 820 1,061 745 450 624 656 
% of total deals 40% 38% 33% 35% 35% 39% 41% 44% 44% 46% 47% 50% 
Data Source: PitchBook, Annual Private Equity Breakdown 2012 
Table 2 Debt Percentage Used (2002-2011) 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Deals<US$ 1 Bn 52% 49% 56% 56% 57% 57% 52% 51% 57% 46% 
Deals>US$1 Bn 63% 71% 55% 67% 67% 56% 61% 62% 59% 61% 
Data Source: PitchBook, Annual Private Equity Breakdown 2012 
Although PE firms were not mainstream before the 1980s, they now manage over $1.2 trillion of capital in the US.  Total 
annual capital raised (commitment) in the US rose from $56 billion in 2001 to $313 billion in 2007, and more than half of them 
were raised by buyout funds according to PitchBook (as shown in table 3). 
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Table 3 Fundraising Activities (2001-2011)  
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Capital raised (US$ bn)  56 79 44 90 142 224 313 312 152 89 93 
# of funds closed 147 142 117 161 252 261 314 273 136 138 142 
Avg fund size (US$ bn) 0.38  0.56  0.38  0.56  0.56  0.86  1.00  1.14  1.12  0.64  0.65  
Date source: PitchBook, Annual Private Equity Breakdown 2012 
There have been numerous empirical studies on the performance of the PE fund since late 1980s (Jensen 1989) and (S. 
Kaplan 1989).  These studies are based on data collected from publically listed companies in European and US markets.  They 
researched two questions: 1) Do buyout funds create value? 2) If they do, what are the sources of value creation?  These 
researchers concluded that private equity/buyout funds create value at the deal level and fund level (net of fees).  They also 
identify four possible sources of such value creation: 1) undervaluation (of the pre-transaction target firm), 2) leverage effect (tax 
shield and disciplining effects), 3) better governance (better control mechanism and incentive realignment) and 4) operational 
improvement. 
The majority of these studies use large samples of cross-section data, available in the US and European countries, measuring 
financial performance of buyout funds on “pre- and post-transaction” basis.  However, to the best of my knowledge, there has 
been no research conducted so far concerning the process of value creation or revealing the “secret recipe”, in term, exploring the  
3
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value-creation capabilities at private equity/buyout funds and their activities.  This study 
attempts to fill that gap and contribute to the research on the subject matter. 
1.1.2 Definition of Value Creation 
Before we can discuss the value-creation process, it is probably necessary to discuss 
the definition of value creation.  Depending on who you ask, you may get many different 
answers.  For the purposes of this study, I define value creation as an absolute increase 
of wealth (absolute investment return) or a relative increase of wealth (relative 
investment return).  The wealth is measured/represented by monetary units.  
Absolute increase of wealth is calculated as the total nominal returns of the asset 
plus the value of the asset minus the total money invested during the same period of 
time.  This simplified calculation ignores the time value of money and inflation factor.  
The result could be positive (value creation), or negative (value destruction). 
Relative increase of wealth is calculated as the absolute increase of wealth against a 
benchmarked asset with the same amount of money invested during the same period of 
time.  The benchmarked asset could be the risk-free asset (Treasury Bill), or stock 
market index fund, etc. 
Most past empirical studies measure the relative increase (decrease) of wealth at the 
deal/transaction or firm level, comparing the investment IRR generated by private 
equity/buyout funds to the return of investment in the stock market index during the 
same period (Harris, Jenkinson and Kaplan 2013).  By doing so, these studies try to 
find out if buyout funds in fact created value for its investors. 
1.2 Related Questions 
Do buyout funds create value?  If they do, where does this value come from?  
To answer these questions, (Kaplan and Schoar 2005) and (Harris, Jenkinson, and 
Kaplan 2013) provide empirical evidence that large and mature private equity/buyout 
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funds outperformed the public market index and realized sustainable investment 
returns.  Furthermore, (Bargeron, Stulz, and Zutter 2007) researched a sample of 1,292 
acquisitions where 407 deals involved a private bidder and 885 deals involved a public 
bidder during the period of 1990-2005 in the US according to the Securities Data 
Company’s (SDC) US Merger and Acquisition Database.  They find that “the mean 
abnormal return for target shareholders is 43% higher if the acquisition is by a public 
firm than by a private firm”.  They also find that “of private firm acquisitions, 36.2% of 
the offers are withdrawn.  In contrast, only 13.8% of the offers are withdrawn when the 
acquirer is a public firm”.  It seems that managers at private firms are “less likely to 
overpay and hence more likely to walk away from a deal than managers from public 
firms”.  They explain that PE firms may do a better job in identifying the undervalued 
target, closing the transaction more quickly (timing market), or possessing better deal-
making negotiation skills than other potential buyers. 
(Renneboog, Simons and Wright 2007) study a sample of 177 public-to-private 
transactions (PTPs) in the U.K. during 1997-2003, which includes the European 
population of leveraged buyouts and buyins.  They examine the magnitude and the 
sources of the expected shareholder gains in the 177 PTPs.  They test “the sources of the 
anticipated value creation of the delisting and distinguish between: tax benefits, 
incentive realignment, control reasons, free cash flow reduction, transactions cost 
reduction, takeover defenses, undervaluation, and wealth transfers”.  They find that 
“the main sources of the shareholder wealth gains are undervaluation of the pre-
transaction target firm, increased interest tax shields, and incentive realignment”. 
In addition, (Acharya, Kehoe and Reyner 2008) research deal-level data on 66 large 
private equity deals (greater than GBP 100 million in enterprise value) in the UK 
initiated during the period of 1996 to 2004 by 12 mature private equity houses.  They 
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claim that "mature private equity houses creating value for portfolio companies through 
active ownership and governance”. 
 Furthermore, (Acharya, Kehoe and Reyner 2008) and (Gadiesh and MacArthur 
2008) show that buyout firms were able to identify profitable investment opportunities, 
make and execute value-creation plans, including cost reduction, efficiency 
improvement, repositioning corporate strategy, exploring favorable add-on 
opportunities, and changing/rebuilding management teams.  
Finally, (Acharya, Moritz and Kehoe 2009) studied 395 of deals closed during the 
period of 1991 to 2007 in Western Europe by 37 large, mature PE houses (each with 
funds larger than ~US $300 million) with a mean gross IRR of 56.1%.  They show that 
the task-specific skills and background of PE’s General Partners (GP) significantly 
contribute to PE’s abnormal return, and found that PE’s abnormal return positively 
correlates with GP’s background and value-creation strategy.  
1.3 What are the Special Capabilities of PE Firms? 
What are the special capabilities of PE firms?  How do they work in the process of 
value creation?  To the best of my knowledge, there does not seem to be research 
conducted so far to address this issue. 
Based on two selected buyout transactions and interviews with six private equity 
firms in China, this research uses a multiple case study approach to explore the 
following: 1) The value-creation process of private equity/buyout funds at the deal level; 
2) Characteristics/composition of the Value-Creation Capability (VCC).    
Furthermore, this paper will propose a value-creation model at the deal level which 
may help to reveal the process of value creation.  
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1.4. Contributions 
The possible theoretical contribution of this paper might be: 1) propose five value-
creation propositions at the deal level; 2) test the suggested propositions through 
interviews with other fund managers, 3) show well-executed deal selections/screenings, 
deal structuring, operation/improvement, and investment exit strategies can still create 
value for the private equity firms and its investors (limited partners) without financial 
leverage (tax shield effective), which normally contributes a significant portion of the 
value created for private equity investment.   
The possible practical contributions of this paper might include: 1) share 
experiences and lessons learned on cross-border transactions (especially in a developing 
economy); 2) reveal the inner workings at private equity firms at the deal level, which is 
the most basic unit of value creation, 3) effective control mechanisms implemented by 
investors is more relevant than ownership stake in influencing the invested company, 4) 
share the experience of SOE reform participated in by private equity/buyout funds in 
China, 5) share the experiences with Chinese local private equity firms and make policy 
recommendations for the development of the Chinese private equity industry. 
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Chapter 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Performance of the PE Fund 
There are numerous studies conducted by many scholars.  The first group of 
studies focus on the performance data from the perspective of General Partners (GP).  
In a research study on 199 transactions made by buyout funds from 1984 to 2004, 
(Groh and Gottschalg 2006) found that buyout funds obtained a higher positive 
abnormal return over risk-adjusted S&P 500.   
Based on a large sample of 5,114 of private equity funds in 39 countries from 1984 to 
2001, (Cumming and Walz 2004) found that the average (median) return of leveraged 
buyouts outperformed that of stock-index at a rate of 26.1% (34.1%).   
Another group of studies focus on the performance data from the perspective of the 
Limited Partners (LP).   
(Harris, Jenkinson and Kaplan 2013) found that “average returns of the US buyout 
funds have exceeded those of public markets for most vintage years since 1984.  The 
Public Market Equivalent (PME) method developed by (Kaplan and Schoar 2005), 
compare actual return net of fees earned by LPs to what the investor would have earned 
in an equivalent investment in the public market.  The results show that on average 
buyout funds outperformed S&P 500 index 20% to 27% over the life of the fund and 
more than 3% per year”.  They also point out a “serious performance data bias in the 
Venture Economics (VE) database, which suggests that the results in (Kaplan and Schoar 
2005) and (Phalippou and Gottschalg 2009) research underestimated fund returns, 
particularly for buyout funds”. 
Specifically, the bias in the VE database was first discovered by (Stocke 2011).  He 
has strong evidence that no additional cash flow was recorded and net asset values 
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remain constant from about 2001 with many funds in the VE database.  Consequently, 
the fund level internal rate of return (IRR) in the VE sample falls within the passage of 
time, while multiples of invested capital remain unchanged rather than increasing.   
In Europe, the Center for Management Buyout Research (CMBOR) of The 
University of Nottingham, U.K. and Adevq, a fund of funds based-in Zurich, Switzerland, 
jointly investigated U.K.-based private equity funds in 2005.  They surveyed 98 of PE 
investors (LPs) and found that those investors claimed a 12.8% of absolute annual return 
from investment in PE, which outperformed stock-index by 4.2% during the same 
period. 
Taken together, the results from above-mentioned research conclude that private 
equity investments do create value, not only at the GP level, but also at the LP level.  
This conclusion leads to further research on “what change did take place at the acquired 
companies post transaction?”  
(Cumming, Siegel and Wright 2007) summarize research conducted in the UK 
(Harries, Siegel and Wright 2005), France (Desbrierers and Schatt 2002), and Sweden 
(Bergstrom, Grub and Jonsson 2007), and conclude that leveraged buyouts (LBO), 
especially management buyouts (MBO), improved the operation efficiency of acquired 
companies.  In addition, (Lichtenberg and Siegel 1990) find a substantial increase of 
total factor productivity of the acquired company after LBO.  Furthermore, based on a 
large sample of large-sized Public-To-Private (PTP) transactions during the 1980s, (S. 
Kaplan 1989) shows that the acquired companies enjoyed a Compounded Annual 
Growth Rate (CAGR) of operating profit of 20%, CAGR of net cash flow of 40%, a 
decrease in capital expenditure to sales, and an increase of enterprise valuation three 
years after LBO. 
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In general, the extant research shows that private equity funds outperform the 
public market.  However, one obvious question continues to persist; that is “is there 
persistence in buyout fund performance?”  To answer this question, (Kaplan and Schoar 
2005) show performance persistence of buyout funds, which is rare among mutual funds 
(Garhart 1997) and hedging funds (Bares, Gibson and Gyger 2002). 
All above studies taken either from the perspective of GPs or LPs, conclude that 1) 
the average return of buyout funds (net of fees) outperform that of risk-adjusted stock 
index; 2) improved financial performance, operational efficiency post transaction; 3) 
performance persistence of the buyout funds.  
2.2 Possible Sources of Value Creation 
Private equity/buyout funds typically use leverage in acquisition transactions.  If E 
represents equity, D represents debt, and P represents total purchase price in a 
transaction, then we get E + D = P.  If Re represents the return of equity, Rd 
represents the return of debt, and Rp represents the return of price paid, then in a 
simplified form, we get a formula: 
Equation 1 Leverage effect 
Re = Rp + (Rp − Rd) × (D/E) 
In which, (Rp − Rd) × (D/E) is used to evaluate leverage effect.  (Rp − Rd) > 0 
means that the leverage effect is positive. 
In an attempt to identify the possible sources of value creation, the following 
researchers conducted several important research projects. 
In a study of 395 of buyout transactions with a deal size over GBP 50 million made 
by large, mature private equity funds from 1995 to 2005, (Acharya, Moritz, and Kehoe 
2009) found that the average internal rate of return (IRR) of those transactions was 
56.1%.  They also found that industry selection and leverage effect jointly contributed 
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8.5% in the said return. A different study (Renneboog, Simons, and Wright 2007), 
identifies potential sources of value gains for the shareholders in public-to-private 
transactions, including tax benefits, incentive realignment, better control procedures, 
free cash flow reduction, transactions cost reduction, takeover defense, undervaluation, 
and wealth transfers, etc.  They claim that the main sources of shareholder value 
increase appear to be from undervaluation of the pre-transaction target firm, increased 
tax shields effect, and incentive realignment. 
Studies by (Acharya, Kehoe, and Reyner 2008), and (Gadiesh and MacArthur 
2008), however, indicate that buyout firms were able to identify profitable investment 
opportunities, make and execute value-creation plans, including cost reduction, 
efficiency improvement, repositioning corporate strategy, exploring favorable add-on 
opportunities, and changing/rebuilding management team. 
All of these studies suggest the following sources of value creation: 1) leverage effect, 
2) incentive realignment, 3) operational improvement, 4) active and improved corporate 
governance, 5) industry selection, and 6) changing/rebuilding management team.    
2.2.1 Tax Shield Hypothesis 
To gain a better understanding, I will take a closer look at the leverage effect.  In 
this regard, a research study (S. Kaplan 1989) finds that the reduced taxes from higher 
interest deductions can explain 4% to 40% of a firm's value.  The lower estimates 
assume that leveraged buyout debt is repaid in eight years and that personal taxes offset 
the benefit of corporate tax deductions.  The higher estimates assume that leveraged 
buyout debt is permanent and that personal taxes provide no offset.  Assuming that the 
truth lies between these various assumptions, a reasonable estimate of the value of lower 
taxes due to increased leverage for the 1980s might be 10% to 20% of firm value. 
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2.2.2 Agency Costs-Related Hypothesis 
The discussion of incentive realignment is essentially the discussion of the reduction 
of agency cost.  In this regard, there are three important agency costs-related 
hypotheses which underlie the motives of buyout (especially PTPs) transactions: 
incentive realignment, control, and free cash flow.  
1) The incentive-realignment hypothesis 
The realignment of managerial incentives with those of shareholders is frequently 
mentioned as an important factor in PTPs.  Research by (S. Kaplan 1989) reports a 
median increase in equity ownership of 4.41% for top the two officers and of 9.96% for 
the other managers in LBOs.  Under the incentive realignment hypothesis, the 
reunification of ownership and control will improve the incentive structure and is 
expected to increase managerial effort to maximize the firm’s value. 
2) The change-of-control hypothesis 
PEs control the boards of acquired companies and actively engage in the corporate 
governance which seems different to passive nature of the boards of publically listed 
companies.  (Acharya, Kehoe and Reyner 2008) find that 1) PE boards led the strategic 
direction at the acquired companies versus passive role by the boards at PLC companies; 
2) PE boards pay close attention on the value-creation process whereas PLCs’ boards 
concentrated on accomplishing seasonal profit targets; 3) PE boards quickly change 
underperformed CEO and CFO; 4) PE boards have fewer members, but spend more time 
on site and interact more frequently with management teams than PLCs’ boards. 
A separate study by (Karakas and Cornelli 2008) claim that board of directors plays 
a pivotal role and reform of the board is the key issue for corporate re-structuring post 
close.  
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3) Free cash flow hypothesis 
A study by (Jensen 1986) indicates that “many of the benefits in going private and 
leveraged buyout transactions seem to be due to the control function of debt”.  The free 
cash flow hypothesis suggests that “high leverage associated with buyout (especially 
PTPs) transactions will reduce wasting free cash flow (FCF) by bonding managers to pay 
out more cash flows to service the debt.  This will be especially beneficial to firms that 
generate large amounts of FCF, on which there are little ‘hard’ claims by outside 
investors” (Renneboog, Simons and Wright 2007).  The burden of debt, together with 
incentive realignment for the top management team members made them work harder 
for the shareholders of the firm.  Therefore, effectively reducing the agency cost.  
2.2.3 Operation Improvement Hypothesis 
Operation improvement is one important source of value creation, as several 
research studies prove, conducted by (Acharya, Kehoe and Reyner 2008), (Gadiesh and 
MacArthur 2008), (Ofek 1994), (Garhart 1997), and (Cumming and Walz 2004).  They 
conclude that PE firms use their knowledge of industry and operation to identify good 
investment opportunities, develop and execute the value-creation plans, with measures 
including cost reduction, efficiency improvement, updated and repositioned corporate 
strategies, looking for favorable acquisition opportunities, and changing the 
management teams, etc. 
The conclusions of these above-mentioned studies identify: 1) tax shield hypothesis, 
2) agency cost-related hypothesis, and 3) operational improvement hypothesis as the 
three main sources of value gains.  Moreover, there are other research studies focused 
on: 1) information asymmetric (undervaluation) hypothesis and 2) the wealth transfer 
hypothesis that could be viewed as sources of value gain as well. 
 
 14 
While the above-mentioned studies are important for a better understanding of the 
performance of the private equity/buyout fund and its sources of value creation, not 
much discussion, if any, touch upon the human factor.  After all, strategy 
implementation is as critical as strategy formulation. A further review of the Upper 
Echelon Theory (Hambrick 1984) may shed light on what type of team and 
characteristics could achieve the desired performance. 
2.3 Upper Echelon Theory 
Top Management Team (TMT) is defined as a high-level management team that is 
responsible for developing and executing corporate strategies, organizing and 
coordinating resources, having decision-making and control power of operational 
management (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996).  
The construct of TMT is first put forward by (Hambrick 1994) in discussion of 
behavioral integration.  He defines it as the collective interactions of thoughts and 
actions among TMT members.  This concept is more comprehensive and concrete than 
previously used measurements such as leadership, cooperation, and communication, 
which are used to measure the operation process respectively.  A study by (Simsek, et al. 
2005) defines the TMT behavioral integration more specifically as TMT members 
exchanging information and knowledge openly and freely with each other, resolving 
conflicts, reaching consensus, executing strategies, and promoting corporate well-being.
 15 
Chapter 3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Overview 
This dissertation is an inductive, qualitative, multiple case study research paper.  
The general approach of this study is “theory building”.  The research design is a 
qualitative, multiple case study (Eisenhardt 1989).  Case study is a preferred research 
strategy for examining complex phenomena because they allow researchers to develop a 
holistic understanding of real-life events.  It particularly suits the research question 
dominated by “how” and “why” (Yin 2014).  
3.2 Research Question 
Building on the previous research conclusion that private equity funds do create 
value, I attempt to provide answers on how private equity funds create value.  By 
looking at the process of value creation by private equity funds before and after an 
investment decision is made, I begin to reveal the “black box”, i.e. inner workings at 
private equity funds.  This is because such questions deal with operational links needing 
to be traced over time, rather than mere frequencies or incidence.  
3.3 Research Design and Data Sources 
Multiple sources of data in this study include documentation (emails, memos, news 
reports clips), archival records (annual reports filed at exchanges, public market index), 
surveys (questionnaires), and intensive interviews.  By having multiple sources of 
evidence, establishing a chain of evidence, I try to test construct validity (Yin 2014).  
3.3.1 Unit of Analysis 
Most previously conducted research focus on the fund/firm level or limited partner 
level, which measure the aggregate investment return on a number of investment 
projects or a number of firms in case of limited partners.  While this approach is valid 
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and meaningful, it does not measure the investment performance at the individual 
transaction/project level.  Thus, it is hard to observe what happened at the individual 
deal/transaction level.  Because of this deficiency, it is not clear how and why certain 
transactions are successful while others are not.  By focusing on the deal/transaction 
level, I attempt to reveal the specific characteristics of successful projects.   
 Typically, a transaction would be carried out by a small group of professionals at a 
private equity fund.  This group normally includes a project/transaction leader (finance 
background), an operation partner/executive, and at least one supporting associate 
(could be more depending on the workload).  During the early phase of the investment, 
deal selection/screening, and structuring and closing, the project leader would take a 
principal role.  Once the deal is closed, the operating partner/executive would take over 
as the leader in helping the invested company improve its operational efficiency.   
3.4 Data Collection  
I collected documentation and archival records and used both structured 
questionnaires and semi-structured, open-ended, conversational interviews.  Each 
interview session lasted between 60-90 minutes, followed by telephone interviews for 
clarification purposes.   
Recording the interviews were pursued unless the interviewees became 
uncomfortable and refused such a request.  Otherwise, detailed notes were taken and a 
written communication was sent to interviewees for confirmation and clarification.  
Recording of the interview, if taken, was transcribed within 24 hours of the interview.  
Detailed notes of the interview were also communicated with the interviewees for 
confirmation or clarifications within the 24-hour timeframe.  
 
 17 
3.4.1 Database 
The database for the case study includes: 1) previous research conducted relating to 
this subject matter, 2) documentation (memos, emails, etc.), 3) archival records (annual 
reports), 4) new report, and 5) interview notes.  
3.4.2 Data Analysis 
Data analysis is partially intended and partially emergent.  Throughout the 
analysis, I shift back and forth between the raw data and the patterns emerged from the 
data.  The analysis takes an iterative path.  The Gouji Mining Machinery (GMM) Case 
has detailed descriptions and covers the whole investment cycle from deal 
selection/screening to the investment exit.  It has a step-by-step review of the process.  
This process description links closely with the research question of “how does private 
equity create value?” and “what happens in the process of value creation?”  From this 
case, I would propose five working propositions.  During the case analysis/discussions, 
some rival explanations would also be addressed to test the internal validity.  
Regarding the GMM case, operational data is presented to compare: 1) with the 
investment return to the public market equivalent, i.e. if an investor invested the same 
amount of money into the public market during the same period of time, what would be 
the theoretical value? 2) with publically listed competitors during the same period of 
time in order to control the industry-specific risk factors, 3) with pre-transaction, six 
years of an investment-holding period and final exit of the investment.  
The Zhengzhou Siwei (ZHSW) Case: The description of the case is less detailed.  
The data is collected from internal communication during QDUS due diligence process 
and the rationale behind the decision not to do the transaction.  There are also news 
reports and interviews with the senior executives at the target company.  Since no 
dataset is available to cover the whole investment period, the theoretical replication 
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approach is used to test proposition 1 (deal selection/screening capability, i.e. a private 
equity sponsor passed the deal because of due diligence result).  On the other hand, the 
corporate sponsor fails to conduct meaningful and effective due diligence and ends up 
with a huge loss.  For this reason, proposition 1 generalizes beyond the type of 
sponsor/investor of the deal.   
3.4.3 Analysis Methods 
Due to the nature of this case study research, I use pattern-matching and 
explanation-building methods to carry out literal or theoretical replications to test 
external validity (Yin 2014). 
3.5 Survey and Interview 
The survey and interview with 6 different private equity funds were conducted.  
The purpose of the surveys and interviews was to test all propositions: 1) deal 
selection/screening capability, 2) operational improvement capability, 3) deal 
structuring capability, 4) investment exit capability, and 5) Top Management Team 
(TMT) capability.  Due to confidentiality reasons, true identities of the interviewees are 
not revealed.   
3.6 Case Boundaries     
The data set of this multiple case study is based on a total of twenty projects/cases 
out of documentation, archival records, surveys, and interviews with six different private 
equity funds.  These funds include the Chinese office of the US-based private equity 
fund, Chinese office of the European-based fund, and local Chinese private equity funds.  
It also covers buyout and growth capital type of investment.  While this represents a 
diverse background of funds and type of investment to avoid research bias for a certain 
type of fund’s investment behavior, the limited number of funds studied/interviewed 
may still present bias, which could impact the conclusion of the study.  Most likely, the 
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bias would be that the investment team at one fund has a certain risk/return appetite 
that would carry over to other projects the fund invested in.  As the Chinese private 
equity industry grows more mature, researchers could have a better chance to observe 
and study with a larger sample size of private equity firms to verify the propositions 
proposed in this paper.  
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Chapter 4 
GMM CASE  
The introduction of a European/American style of private equity/buyout investment 
model into China (a developing economy) can be traced back to the early 1990s.  
However, such an investment model encountered unique challenges due to a different 
legal/regulatory environment in China.  In general, the challenges included foreign 
exchange control, restrictions of foreign investment in certain industries, and an under- 
developed financial system.  In particular, financial leverage, which is commonly used 
in developed markets such as Europe and the US, is not allowed by laws in China.  
Consequently, private equity/buyout activities in China are still in the early stages of 
development.   
4.1 Macro-Economic and Policy Environment for Foreign Investment 
The recent development of a market economy China shows two characteristics.  On 
one hand, it has evolved in terms of “depth” and “width”.  Development in “depth” 
indicates division of labor is becoming detailed, and the production mode is becoming 
more indirect.  The “depth” of market economy development influences the efficiency of 
production in terms of quantity and categories of products and services provided.  
Development in the “width” of economy indicates that China‘s participation in a broader 
range of international division of labor includes cooperation with more economic entities 
from different geographic areas.  More categories of products and services are being 
offered because of this type of cooperation.   
After 30 years of reforms, China is still transforming itself from a centrally planned 
economy to a market economy.  Consequently, the “visible hand” of government is still 
frequently seen in economic affairs.  Needless to say, the policy environment is an 
important factor for foreign investment in China.  Oftentimes, policies and/or change of 
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policies become investment obstacles even deal breakers.  This uncertain policy 
environment makes investments in China challenging to foreign investors.  It is 
difficult, if not impossible, to make accurate financial return forecasts and monitor the 
investment process.   
4.1.1 Foreign Exchange Control 
China has the largest foreign reserves in the world.  Due to historical reasons, 
however, China is still practicing foreign exchange control on capital accounts even 
though there are some new developments toward relaxing, eventually lifting such a 
control mechanism.  This control regime makes it very important for the foreign 
investors to design a sensible deal structure to insure the smooth process of investment 
and exit.   
4.1.2 Bank Lending Regulation 
The Chinese financial industry is still in the development stage.  In particular, 
commercial banks, mostly SOEs, still lag behind its western counterparts in terms of 
sophistication in banking expertise.  The regulatory regime is also in the early stage of 
development.  According to the Commercial Bank Law (2004) in China, commercial 
banks are not allowed to provide debt financing to merger and acquisition (M&A) 
transactions.  After years of lobbying efforts led by industry professionals, the central 
bank finally allowed commercial banks to provide debt financing to M&A transactions in 
China in 2008.  However, the new rule still has strict limitations on such debt 
financing.  Due to these limitations, also the inexperience of the commercial banks to 
handle such a new line of business, very few M&A transactions with financial leverage 
have been reported.  The rare reported cases are all with transactions sponsored by 
SEOs.  This situation is improving, but is still far from satisfactory.   
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4.1.3 Policy on Asset Transfer at SOE  
There are several restrictions in regard to the sales/transfer of assets/equity from an 
SOE.  These restrictions include: 1) the asset has to be appraised by a qualified 
appraisal firm, 2) there has to be a public auction process, 3) the final transaction value 
should not be lower than 90% of the appraised value, and 4) the validity of the appraisal 
report is only one year.  All these restrictions make it very difficult for a foreign investor 
to acquire an SOE.  While these restrictions, with good intentions by design, serve a 
purpose of protecting state assets not being sold “cheaply”, they do create obstacles in a 
practical sense.   
4.1.4 Accounting and Tax Polices 
Chinese accounting principles have some major differences in comparison with that 
of International Accounting Standards (IAS) or General Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP).  Even though Chinese accounting principles are adopting more international 
standards in recent years, these differences make it difficult for foreign investors to judge 
and negotiate valuation of a target company with the seller.  In particular, accounting 
treatment in regard to revenue recognition, inventory valuation, and bad debt reserves 
are dramatically different.  
Contrary to what many may believe, China is far from a low tax country.  According 
to the World Bank Report released in 2015 (as shown in Table 4), the overall tax rate for 
companies in China is as high as 63.7%.  Although there may be some local preferential 
tax treatment and withholding tax arrangements extended to foreign investors, the 
attractiveness of investments by foreign investors in China has been declining as the 
result of high-level taxation. 
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Table 4 Tax or Mandatory Contributions in China (2014) 
Tax or mandatory 
contribution 
Payments 
(number) 
Time 
(hours) 
Statutory 
tax rate 
Tax base 
Total tax 
rate    
(% profit) 
Employer paid - Social 
Security and housing 
fund contributions 
1 142 37%+7% 
gross 
salaries 
49.6 
Corporate income tax 1 70 25% 
taxable 
profits 
5.7 
Urban maintenance tax 0  7% VAT and BT 3.5 
Education surcharge 0  3% VAT and BT 1.5 
Real estate tax 1  1.20% 
80% 
building 
value 
1 
Stamp duty 1  0.03% transactions 1 
Business tax 1  5% capital gain 0.5 
Levies for construction 
and maintenance of 
river projects 
0  1% VAT and BT 0.5 
Land use tax 1  
RMB 
6/m2 
land area 0.4 
Value added tax (VAT) 1 106 17% value added  
Totals: 7 318   63.7 
Source: The World Bank 
 
 
 24 
4. 2 GMM Case Description  
4. 2.1 Transaction Participants 
The buyer: QDUS is a leading buyout fund specializing in middle-market 
transactions with its head office based in the United States.  GMM (or the “Company”) 
was a special-purpose holding company established by QDUS in December 2005 to work 
as the acquiring entity. 
The seller: Provincial State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC) was the owner of J&J Co.  J&J Co., the target company as an 
SOE, was a leading manufacturer of underground coal mining machinery (road header 
and shearer) in China.  
4.2.2 The Investment Process at GMM 
Figure 1 Investment Process at GMM   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.3 Description of the Two Transaction Stages 
Stage one—platform acquisition: In May 2006, GMM acquired 100% of shares of 
J&J via a public auction process.  J&J is the leading local manufacturer of road header 
and shearer used in underground coal mining in China.  J&J was acquired by GMM as a 
In Aug. 2005, 
QDUS received a 
bidding invitation 
in participation of 
the auction of J&J 
for 100% of its 
shares. 
In Dec. 2005, QDUS 
established GMM 
and started due 
diligence on J&J. 
In May 2006, 
GMM acquired 
100% of shares of 
J&J through the 
mandate auction 
process. 
In Jan. 2008, 
GMM acquired 
75% of shares of 
HNLW. 
In Feb. 2010, 
GMM was listed 
in H.K. Stock 
Exchange. 
In July 2010, 
GMM acquired 
100% of shares 
of QTXC. 
In Dec. 2011, 
JGI bought 
GMM through 
tender offer.  
QDUS exited. 
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platform for post-acquisition integration and follow-up investments in the Chinese coal 
mine machinery industry.  When the transaction was complete, there was no debt 
financing used as the commercial banks were not permitted to provide loans to the 
sponsor of a buyout transaction.  GMM acquired J&J’s 100% shares (including 
assuming all debts) all in cash.  
Stage two- add-on acquisitions: GMM intends to provide a total solution for 
underground coal mining to its customers.  The total solution includes four products: 
road header, shearer, armored face conveyer, (AFC) and hydraulic roof support.  These 
4 type of products are widely used in the underground long wall mining working-face.  
GMM realized its strategy by consolidation/integration through a series of add-on 
acquisitions.  In January 2008, GMM acquired 75% of shares of Huai Nan Long Wall 
(HNLW), which is a Chinese local manufacturer of armored face conveyer in China.  In 
July 2010, GMM acquired 100% of shares of Qingdao Tian Xun Company (QTXC), which 
is a Chinese local provider of electronic control system for coal mining machinery in 
China.  
4.2.4 Financial Performance of GMM 
IRR: During the period from June 2006 to December 2011, QDUS realized over 80% 
of IRR by investment in GMM.  It is worth noting that this return is realized without 
any financial leverage due to Chinese banking regulation.  The Public Market 
Equivalent (PME) method developed by (Kaplan and Schoar 2005), compares actual 
return net of fees earned by LPs to what the investor would have earned in an equivalent 
investment in the public market.  QDUS’s IRR of investment in GMM outperformed 
Public Market Equivalent (PME) in comparison with public market index performance. 
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Table 5 IRR at GMM versus PME 
IRR of QDUS’ Investment in GMM 80.40% 
Stock Market Index PME 
Shanghai Composite Index 7.96% 
Shenzhen Composite Index 18.40% 
SSE SME Composite 20.00% 
Hang Seng Index 1.23% 
S&P 500 Index -1.31% 
Dow Jones Industrial Average 0.73% 
Nasdaq Composite Index 1.33% 
Notes: Detailed calculations are listed in Appendix A 
As Table 5 shows, the financial performance of GMM compares with the PME 
calculation involving all major indexes from mainland China, Hong Kong, and the US.  
As illustrated, the financial return is significantly better than PME.  This may be 
explained by the fact that private equity investments are much more risky due to the 
illiquid nature.  Therefore, the risk and return ration is hugely different.  Yet, the 
return beat the market by such a huge margin, it indicates private equity investment, if 
managed well, can still deliver a reasonable, if not better result, adjusted for its risk.    
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Table 6 Performance Comparison with Major Competitors 
Note: SANY INTL’s financials in 2007 is not available, so the period used in this table for 
SANY INTL’s financials is from 2008 to 2011.  More detailed information is listed in 
Appendix B.  
 
Data source: Financial reports from each company filed with Shanghai and Hong Kong 
Stock Exchanges.   
 
Table 6 shows GMM’s performance comparison with its industry competitors in 
China.  These competitors are the top level manufacturers out of over 1,000 coal mining 
machinery makers in China.  Collectively, they represent about 80% of market share in 
the market for the same products.  Table 6 shows Compound Annual Growth Rate 
(CAGR) of revenue at GMM is over 25%, which is the second lowest among its 
competitors.  However, CAGR of total asset (representing capital expenditure) is the 
lowest at 23.36%.  This implies the conservative operating philosophy at GMM.  While 
conservatively optimistic about the sector growth potential, GMM is also careful about 
any possible industry downturns.  This pro-growth, yet conservative approach 
differentiates GMM from its competitors.  It is common for the Chinese manufacturing 
Financials                 
(RMB in mm) 
GMM 
ERA 
Mining 
SANY 
INT'L 
China 
Coal 
Tiandi 
Zhengzhou 
Coal 
CAGR of 
Revenue 
25.06% 93.91% 48.83% 23.23% 38.25% 28.98% 
CAGR of EBIT 
Margin 
6.42% -5.20% 3.04% -1.37% -1.60% 4.00% 
CAGR of EBIT 
per Person 
29.47% N/A 20.93% 13.14% 9.24% N/A 
CAGR of Total 
Asset 
23.36% 90.56% 33.72% 34.23% 36.73% 38.46% 
CAGR of # of 
Employees 
2.80% N/A 26.82% 1.26% 24.54% N/A 
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companies to build more capacity by investing heavily in capital equipment when growth 
opportunity presents without much consideration for any possible market downturn.   
Critics of private equity firms often claim that PE houses are “asset strippers” at the 
target companies as means to gain financial benefit.  However, GMM’s example of a 
consistent yet conservative investment into the company at CAGR of 23.36% does not 
support such a claim. 
Shown in Table 6, CAGR of EBIT margin at 6.42%, and CAGR of EBIT per person at 
29.47% are the highest among all competitors.  This implies GMM continuously 
improves its operation, raises productivity, and in turn, improves the earning power of 
the company whereas Chinese competitors are trying to grab more market shares with 
less consideration on profitability of the operation.  CAGR’s number of employee is the 
second lowest among its competitors.  While employment increased moderately, GMM 
spent much time on employee training, organization reform, and redesign of incentive 
system.  All these efforts greatly improved total production factors.  
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Table 7 GMM’s Performance over the Investment Period 
RMB in mm 
except ratios 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
2007- 
2011 
Direct Material 380.4 368.9 615.6 731.4 849.4 894.6 3,459.9 
Direct Labor 39.4 40.4 57.0 69.8 76.9 85.3 329.4 
Cost of 
Manufacturing 
97.7 95.1 132.0 143.2 174.2 207.7 752.2 
Total 517.5 504.4 804.6 944.4 1,100.5 1,187.6 4,541.5 
Fixed Cost 24.8 27.9 32.9 32.1 34.3 47.1 174.3 
Variable Cost 492.8 476.5 771.8 912.4 1,066.2 1,140.5 4,367.4 
Variable Cost 
/Fixed Cost 
19.9 17.1 23.5 28.5 31.1 24.2 25.1 
Table 7 shows that over the time of investment, the ratio of variable cost over fixed 
cost gradually increased from 19.9% to 31.1%.  Throughout this investment period, 
continuous improvements were made and productivity was improved.  It implies the 
growth driver at GMM is mainly operating leverage (productivity improvement) rather 
than heavy spending on capital expenditure.  However, at the end of 2011, there was 
major capital expenditure occurred as a part of IPO commitment.  While somewhat 
contradicting to its previous effort on controlling capital expenditure spending, it 
indicates a private equity firm committing itself to sustain growth at the invested 
company by investing further in upgrading technology and hardware.   
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4.3 The Value-Creation Process at GMM 
4.3.1 Deal Selection and Screening 
As an experienced private equity firm focusing on middle-market transactions in the 
US, QDUS has developed methodologies that proved to be useful in the deal 
selection/screening process.  The Chinese office of QDUS also has completed more than 
20 transactions before the J&J deal.  These transactions cover manufacturing 
companies ranging from plastic injection molding, plastic extrusion, precision aluminum 
die casting, electric motors and gears, metering instruments for gas, and electric and 
water applications.    
Years of successful investing into the manufacturing companies in China, the office 
of QDUS in China has become one of the most respected and experienced private equity 
firms in China.  To make an investment decision, QDUS China would evaluate the 
target company in terms of deal size, growth potential (EBITDA and revenue), 
integration opportunities post deal, acquisition multiple, potential risks (and if they are 
controllable), and investment exit strategies and opportunities.  An investment decision 
is made only if the target company meets the firm’s investment criteria.     
In terms of deal size for J&J, the proposed transaction value of J&J was estimated to 
be in the range of USD $100-120 million which seemed appropriate for QDUS since it 
specialized in middle-market transactions which typically ranges from USD $50 million 
to USD $1 billion.   
The valuation of the target company was estimated to be about 4 times of EBITDA 
(2004) based on the audited financials provided by a third-party service provider.  This 
level of valuation seemed to be appropriate for QDUS given the absence of debt financing 
on the transaction.    
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In evaluation of growth potential (EBITDA and revenue), QDUS estimated the 
market size of coal mining machinery in China may grow at a compound annual rate of 
20%-30% in the following 5 to 8 years.  The main growth drivers are: 1) Nearly 70% of 
the electricity consumed in China are generated by coal-fired power plants.  The overall 
growth in the Chinese economy would create persistent demand for coal consumption, 
which would have to generate enough power to support the GDP growth targeted by the 
government.   
However, the dependence on coal consumption for energy supply will not be 
significantly changed given the lack of alternative energy sources available to support the 
economic growth in short term. 2) Safety initiatives by government-required Chinese 
coal mines to mechanize the production process in order to reduce deaths and/or 
injuries in the underground coal mining industry.  As a leading manufacturer of 
underground coal mining machinery in China, J&J should benefit from said policies.  
This “industry selection” (Acharya, Moritz, and Kehoe 2009), turns out to be a very 
important contributor to the ultimate investment return.   
When considering investment into J&J, QDUS also identified add-on acquisition 
opportunities to consolidate J&J (road header and shearer manufacturer) with other 
manufacturers of “armored face conveyer” and “hydraulic roof support” to provide a 
total solution to underground coal mines.  This total solution would provide a better 
customer experience, therefore, J&J would be able to satisfy the needs of the customers.  
The total solution (one-stop shopping) approach is well adopted in other industries.  
However, due to historical reasons, this practice was never adopted during the period 
when the company was an SOE.  Identification of add-on investment opportunities is 
also a key contributor for value creation (Acharya, Kehoe, and Reyner 2008) (Gadiesh 
and MacArthur 2008).  
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While considering the positive side of the transaction, QDUS also considered the 
potential risks of this proposed transaction.  Due to rules and restrictions by SASAC on 
the selling of assets of an SOE, and the lack of experience of SASAC personnel in charge 
of this transaction, it was a challenge to close the acquisition before the deadline.  If the 
transaction could not be closed before the deadline, which is one year from asset 
appraisal date, it would have to start a new asset appraisal process and a new public 
auction.   
Prior to working on this transaction, the QDUS China team has been reviewing over 
300 potential investment proposals each year.  Most of the proposals were killed 
because they were unfit with the investment criteria.  QDUS only does due diligence 
investigations on a few projects a year.   
With the approval from the investment committee, the QDUS China team led the 
due diligence (DD) investigation process which involved third-party professional service 
firms.  The objective is to identify and verify the market opportunities/risks 
(commercial DD), potential financial/tax risks (financial & tax DD), and potential legal 
risks (legal DD).  This process took 10 months to complete in which the DD team went 
back and forth many times.  Due diligence results showed no serious deal breakers. 
4.3.2 Deal Structuring 
Carve out non-core business activities: Like many SOEs in China, J&J owned and 
operated many auxiliary businesses which has nothing to do with its core business 
activities, but carrying out its social responsibilities.  These activities include running a 
hospital, kindergarten, and primary and secondary schools.  Obviously, QDUS would 
have to discuss and negotiate with the provincial SASAC to carve out these non-business 
activities prior to the close of the transaction. 
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Negotiation: QDUS negotiated with the provincial SASAC about the term sheet 
which included valuation, payment terms, and a list of conditions to close.  It is worth 
noting that that QDUS insisted on a settlement of the employee’s pension obligations at 
the SOE, and starting a new employment relationship with the new entity.  It later 
turned out to be a key decision that smoothed the initial public offering process at Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange.  
In structuring this deal, QDUS established GMM Cayman and GMM H.K. as the 
holding companies to acquire J&J.  This structure allowed QDUS to benefit from 
withholding tax rules among mainland China, Hong Kong, and Cayman and also enable 
QDUS to exit the investment more easily in the future.  
4.3.3 Operation Improvement 
QDUS believes that the closing of a deal is just the beginning of the value-creation 
process.  There is a tendency at any organization to maintain status quo, not to change 
its existing system that has been in place for a long time.  Even after realizing the 
existing system has many flaws needing to be fixed, people are afraid of change that may 
bring uncertainty.  They tend to resist change and refuse to even try.  QDUS realized 
that if the reform at J&J was necessary, it was better to do it right after the close of a 
transaction.   
In order to lead the transformation process, QDUS established GMM’s executive 
committee (EXEC).  The EXEC is tasked with the reorganization process, which would 
transform the governance model from an SOE to a private corporate entity.  EXEC 
knew that it was necessary to demonstrate the determinations of reform not by words, 
but actions.  Sometimes, EXEC brought in independent consulting firms to show there 
might be better ways to do what the employees have been doing.  Other times, EXEC 
required subsidiaries to set up continuous improvement (CI) units to lead the 
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incremental operation improvement.  During the reform process, one of the important 
things was to find a right person to lead a CI unit.  If we want to create value, there 
should be leaders who are doing right things in the right ways.  
 On the operation-improvement front, here are the growth initiatives to increase 
revenue: 
Reorganization of sales and marketing: Historically, J&J, HNLW, and QTXC sold 
their products independently to the same coal mine customers.  EXEC decided to set up 
a sales/marketing team at the group level in order to share customer demand 
information and practice cross-selling products made by different subsidiaries.  As a 
result, each subsidiary increased its selling opportunity and learned new customer 
demand information.  The sales and marketing team also worked closely with the 
finance and accounting department to control credit risk and receivables from each 
customer.  The effort resulted in increased revenue and reduced cost and better credit 
risk control.   
Reorganization of Research and Development (R&D): J&J, HNLW, and QTXC 
designed and manufactured products independently before they became a part of the 
new entity.  As a result, there had not been any collaboration among the subsidiaries on 
R&D.  With the help of EXEC, GMM set up an R&D center at the group level and 
developed customized designs with each product team.  EXEC, through the global 
network of QDUS, also introduced global market leaders of professional equipment to 
collaborate with GMM in developing new products, such as new road headers with gas 
detection sensors and continuous miners.  
Another area of operation improvement is “productivity initiative” that aimed at 
cost reduction.   
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Reorganization of supply chain: GMM’s supply team worked as a procurement 
information center and a buyer of bulk raw material (such as steel plate and profiles), 
explosion-proof motors, and electronic control systems.  Group purchase bargaining 
power helped not only reduce the total purchase cost as a result of volume discount, but 
also strengthened the after-market service capability and integration-design capability. 
Adjustment of product offerings: An internal research made in 2007 showed that 
J&J manufactured a total of 18 series with 66 product models of shearer in the preceding 
three years.  However, only 15 models contributed over 80% of the revenue and gross 
profit.  EXEC made a decision that the R&D (and the marketing) should concentrate on 
improving the 15 models of shearer in the future. 
Parts standardization and modularization: The Bill of Material (BOM) for shearer at 
J&J included over 10,000 of parts in 2007.  By changing product offerings, and 
introduction of parts standardization and modularization program, the BOM of shearer 
reduced to 2,500 parts in 2009.  The smaller-sized BOM enabled the company to have a 
lower inventory level, reduced lead time, and a simplified production process.  This 
effort alone improved cash flow and profitability at the company.  
Introduction of lean manufacturing: Due to historical reasons, J&J adopted batch 
production process with a function-based layout.  Batch production process had caused 
serious work in process (WIP) inventory issues and production bottlenecks.  EXEC 
brought in an independent consulting firm to train J&J staff to change to a lean 
manufacturing process.  Eight CI units were set up.  They drew the value stream map 
(VSM), projected the process reengineering step by step, and began at incremental 
operational improvement.  This included observing seven wastes on site, operation 
process standardization, Single Minute Exchange of Die (SMED), and partially  
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reconstructing the production processes to implement one-piece flow.  These activities 
minimized WIP and shortened lead time.  
In addition to the “growth initiatives” and “productivity initiatives”, there are also 
other areas that private equity firms can create value.  For example, control and 
compliance are two such areas: 
In order to reduce operational risks and meet the compliance requirements, EXEC 
encouraged GMM to establish an internal control system and reorganize business units.  
These efforts are nicknamed as “plugging leak”. 
Financial control: EXEC selected and designated a chief financial officer (CFO) to 
each subsidiary.  The CFO set up a new financial control system in the subsidiary 
according to the new internal control system implemented.  This new financial control 
system always included line of authority (such as up limit of contract size permitted to be 
signed by each salesman), budget control, and audit control.  The CFO also carried out 
cost-control measures, including verification of the proper cost accounting model.  
EXEC realized that if the inaccurate cost accounting assumption was present, then the 
effective cost-saving decision-making was difficult, especially in the case where there was 
a bulk of booking WIP inventory.  
Receivable control: EXEC implemented customer credit line system not only in each 
subsidiary but also in GMM as a group.  GMM gave a credit line to a customer.  The 
sum of credits extended by each subsidiary to the same customer should not be over the 
total limit set by the group.  EXEC also implemented a collection of the account 
receivable system in each subsidiary.  The sales/marketing team at the head office 
provided a general guideline to train and educate salespeople in identifying potential risk 
of receivables and steps on collection of overdue receivables. 
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Capital expenditure control: EXEC strictly controlled capital expenditure budgets at 
each subsidiary.  The subsidiary was required to submit a detailed capital expenditure 
plan with business rationale.  This requirement seems to be simple and reasonable, but 
it is not implemented during the SOE time.  Management teams at subsidiaries always 
have the urge to build an “empire” regardless of its real business needs.  In most capital 
budget plans submitted, management teams tend to use the short-term market demand 
to justify the urge to expand production capacity.  For example, a management team at 
the road header business unit submits a capital budget plan for building a new assembly 
workshop claiming that there is not enough space for assembly work so that it becomes a 
production bottleneck.  EXEC, together with the management team members, took a 
closer look at the situation and found that the issues could be resolved by introducing 
better storage and layout of sub-assembly parts.  By installing vertical shelfs for parts 
storage, it creates ample work space for assembly.  There is no need to build another 
assembly workshop.    
There are other cases where EXEC decided to incur capital expenditures on new 
equipment, such as installing a gas-heating furnace for forging operation in replacement 
of a coal-burning heating furnace, or installing a ventilation system in a welding 
workshop.  This type of capital expenditure does not increase production capacity, but 
rather for energy efficiency and/or Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) or environmental compliance purpose.  Controlling capital expenditure 
measures are not intended to just control cash outlay, it means to improve productivity 
and raise efficiency of the operation.    
4.3.4 Investment Exit 
As discussed above, as a mature private equity firm, QDUS considered the 
investment exit opportunities even prior to its investment, and throughout the entire 
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holding period of the investment.  The team at QDUS consistently met and entertained 
potential buyers including private equity firms, sovereign wealth fund managers, fund of 
fund managers, and corporate buyers.  In fact, QDUS discussed potential trade sale 
opportunities with a corporate buyer numerous times prior to its decision to do an initial 
public offering (IPO).  The transaction did not take place because no agreement can be 
reached on the valuation of the transaction.  Trade sale, if it can be arranged, would be a 
relatively easy exit for a private equity investment in which sellers can trade off its higher 
valuation multiples for a quick exit.   
While the IPO may present a higher investment return for private equity firms, at 
the same time, it does present risks of a prolonged process with uncertainty of capital 
market fluctuation.  A trade-off risk and return decision has to be made by the private 
equity firm.   
In the case of GMM, QDUS finally decided to list the company at Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange in early 2010.  Excellent financial performance at GMM drew attention from 
fund managers and general public.  This also made the corporate buyer who discussed a 
possible acquisition of the company before GMM’s listing more interested in the 
transaction.  As a publically traded entity, GMM’s market value is transparent.  Thus, 
there is no need for intensive negotiation between the buyer and seller.  Therefore, Joy 
Global, a global manufacturer of coal mine equipment, acquired 100 percent shares of 
GMM via a public-to-private transaction at the end of 2011.  
Throughout the process of investment exit, the QDUS team demonstrated expert 
knowledge, experience, and skills in working and negotiating with investment bankers, 
law firms and accounting firms.  This capability at QDUS maximized the financial 
return for its investment.    
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4.3.5 The Role of EXEC 
QDUS led the formation of GMM and promoted the result-oriented culture at the 
new entity.  QDUS believed that equity incentive plan could motivate the team and 
solve part of the motivation issue (or “why they do”), but GMM also needed strong 
leaders to lead the employee to move forward (or “where to go” and “how to do it”).  
This “incentive realignment”, i.e. reunification of ownership and control is expected to 
increase managerial effort to maximize the firm’s value (S. Kaplan 1989).   
As a mature private equity firm and an active shareholder, QDUS established 
GMM’s executive committee (EXEC) and introduced an incentive plan for senior 
management team members.   
Table 8 Profile of the Executive Team Members 
  A B C D E 
Years of experience at senior-level management 30 25 25 25 25 
# of companies invested in the past 50+ 35 5 0 0 
Years of experience in coal-mining machinery 
industry 
0 0 0 40 35 
Years of experience in finance/investment 15 17 5 0 0 
Years of experience in operation management 15 8 20 40 35 
Time spent in China (days/year) 
3 
250
+ 
250
+ 
300
+ 
300
+ 
Internal communication frequency (#/month) 4+ 8+ 8+ 8+ 8+ 
Time spent at subsidiaries (days/year) 
14 90+ 90+ 
200
+ 
200
+ 
As shown in Table 8, the EXEC includes five members, two of whom are Chinese 
locals (CEO of J&J and HNLW respectively), two are from QDUS, and one person was 
former head of Asia for a well-known multinational company.  The members of EXEC 
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worked as transformational leadership team at GMM.  QDUS guided the setup of a line 
of authorities as well as responsibilities among the five members, designed the decision-
making process, and managed the communication and conflict resolution among the 
members, which finally seemed to have a great influence on the performance of GMM.   
The EXEC members are highly complementary to each other in skillset and area of 
expertise.  Without except, each member has solid operation experience even though 
two of them are partners at  QDUS.  The EXEC members exchange information and 
knowledge openly and freely with each other, resolve conflicts, reach consensus, execute 
strategies, and promote corporate well-being (Simsek, et al. 2005).  
GMM’s goal is to achieve objective as a “C-C-D” triangle, i.e. compliance, (legal and 
financial) creation (value), and (employee) development, which support and influence 
each other.  EXEC led GMM to realize the “C-C-D” objectives by the following activities: 
1) Reformulating corporate strategies 
Under the leadership of the EXEC, GMM acquired HNLW and QTXC as add-on 
acquisitions, which not only grew the revenue at the company, but also strengthened the 
competitiveness of the company and enhanced the market position. 
Market positions of GMM’s subsidiaries were different.  J&J was the market leader 
of road header and shearer, while HNLW was the niche player of the armored face 
conveyer market.  Given the different market position of each subsidiary, EXEC, 
together with the management team, reformulated different competitive strategies for 
the subsidiaries right after the close of the transaction.  J&J adopted strategies to 
maintain its market leadership position.  This strategy requires concentration on only 
20% of its total product models involving new and existing products that contribute 80% 
of its operating profit.  Meanwhile, HNLW adopted a strategy to expand its share in a 
niche market and to bear lower profit margin than J&J.  
 41 
2) Organizational re-structure 
Under the leadership of the EXE, GMM transformed the original structure of 
divisional to matrix structure in order to benefit from synergies derived from integration 
of R&D, sales and marketing, procurement and human resources management.  For 
this purpose, EXEC made a decision to set up GMM’s head office in Beijing with several 
functional departments such as a R&D center, sales and marketing, and supply chain 
management.  The object is to achieve operational synergies among different business 
units.  
3) Change of incentive plan for management staff and performance review standard for 
employees. 
While introducing operation improvement projects to subsidiaries, and monitoring 
the improvement process, EXEC found that the challenge was not an issue of if there 
might be a better way to do things, but an issue of that how to motivate employees to find 
out and adopt a better way to do things.  It means that a successful improvement 
project needs not only the knowledge and technique but also the new incentive plan.  As 
a long-time SOE, employees at J&J are used to promotions or raises based on “seniority” 
or “relationship” rather than on performance.  The “Iron Rice Bowl” mentality of 
employment, if not changed, would not make the company competitive in the market.  
In fact, the lack of a proper incentive system could make the company less competitive.  
For example, during the time that J&J was an SOE, the company encouraged R&D 
engineers to develop “new” products.  However, while this policy was designed with 
good intentions, it was abused by engineers.  They claimed to customize the product as 
a way to better serve the customer, by designing parts using non-standard steel plates.  
This “new” product created unnecessary production difficulties and drove up cost  
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because the parts cannot be shared with other product models.  The design engineers 
were doing so only because they could get reward for their “creativity”.    
EXEC realized that it is the incentive regime that caused unintended consequences.  
This situation must be changed.  EXEC helped J&J to set up new R&D process where a 
comprehensive review of “new” product would have to be assessed in terms of its 
potential market size and/or if it is necessary to change the size of the material of the 
part.  Participants in the new product review would include staff not only from R&D 
department, but also from sales/marketing, production, and supply chain management 
departments.  R&D engineers would be rewarded only if the new product was accepted 
by customers for its uniqueness, and most importantly, if the company benefited from 
such a new product launch. 
The aforementioned example is just one of many changes at GMM in regard to an 
employee incentive/reward plan and performance appraisal where good performance is 
rewarded, and bad performance is penalized.  By changing the performance appraisal 
and incentive regime, employees are motivated.  As a result, the total number of 
employees at the company remained almost constant where the revenue rose four times 
during a period of six years.   
GMM also recruited professionals specializing in design, technical marketing, 
supply chain management, and operational improvement from the marketplace inside 
and/or outside of China.  It promoted internal transfers of employees among 
subsidiaries, especially transferring J&J’s engineers and other professionals to HNLW 
and QTXC to support their rapid growth.  All these initiatives are designed to enhance 
the competitiveness of the company in the market.  
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4) Promoting new corporate culture by implementation of a code of conduct (business 
ethics).   
GMM, as a leading player operating in the Chinese coal mine industry, has been in 
existence for a long time.  While long history is a huge asset for the brand name and 
goodwill of the company, it also has history of business practices that are not in 
compliance.  To avoid legal exposure in this area, EXEC made an effort in promoting 
legal/ethical conducts, distributed a handbook of “rule and regulations” to all employees 
at the company including all subsidiaries.  EXEC also made a decision to spin off the 
corporate sales team and make them become independent agents/brokers/dealers to 
avoid/reduce potential non-compliance risk in sale activities.   
4.4 GMM Case Discussion  
From GMM case above, it seems that a successful buyout fund must possess four 
capabilities at the deal level: 1) deal selection/screening, 2) operational improvement, 3) 
deal structuring, and 4) investment exit. 
4.4.1 Capability of Deal Selection/Screening  
The objective of deal selection/screening is to identify the right industry and right 
target company to invest.  The capability of deal screening covers: 1) proprietary deal 
source and 2) strict deal screening.   
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Figure 2 Deal Selection/Screening Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As Figure 2 shows, the deal selection/screening process involves various steps in 
obtaining deal information through a proprietary deal source, conducting industry 
research, operational due diligence investigation on the target company, negotiating 
term sheet with the target company, engaging a third party to conduct a thorough due 
diligence investigation.  The due diligence investigation includes financial, tax, legal, 
commercial as well as environmental.  Personal background checks on key executives 
are conducted, if needed. 
Deals that are selected through this vigorous process become a small percentage of 
the deals reviewed by private equity firms.  According to data at one firm interviewed, 
the number of active projects as a percentage of total projects at each stage is as follows: 
industry research (8%)  non-disclosure agreement (NDA) (2%)  due diligence (0.5%) 
 negotiation and signing agreement (0.3%)  deal closing (0.3%).  
Proposition 1 ---Deal selection/screening is the most important step in the value-
creation process by a private equity firm, if not done well, investment performance will 
suffer.  
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While the ability to select/screen the right deal is important, it is not the only 
capability a PE fund must have for its investment to be successful.  
There is one research study showing that private equity firms “created” value by 
acquiring under-valued companies (Renneboog, Simons, and Wright 2007).  However, 
my research findings do not support such an observation.  GMM was acquired by QDUS 
through a public auction process which was administered by SASAC.  The auction 
participants include private equity firms, corporate buyers from China and abroad.  It is 
hard to imagine that during such a competitive bidding process, any potential investors, 
regardless of private equity firms or corporate entities would have an advantage in 
acquiring under-valued assets.  Unlike the early days, it is significantly more difficult to 
gain advantage for private equity firms in acquiring undervalued assets due to the 
development of auctions for private equity deals (Cumming, Siegel, and Wright 2007). 
4.4.2 Capability of Operational Improvement 
Proposition 2---Private equity firm must provide value-added services on operation 
improvement at the invested company to create value. Financial engineering alone 
cannot generate the expected financial return.  
When a PE fund invests into a company, it would want to control the board of an 
acquired company and improve operation by making strategy decisions and organizing 
top management teams in order to improve competitiveness through reorganizing 
existing production factors and adding new production factors.  The efforts are not 
limited to cost reduction and/or efficiency improvement, but also enhancing overall 
competitiveness.  However, this maneuver may be subject to acceptance by the 
entrepreneur/founder of the company if the investment is a growth-capital type, i.e. 
minority investment.  Nevertheless, operation improvement becomes a key source of  
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value creation for PE investments.  Operation improvement may include, but is not 
limited to a “top-line initiative” and “bottom-line initiative” approach. 
 The “top line” approach mainly involves new product development, new 
channels, new geographies, existing geographies, and existing customers.  This growth-
oriented strategy is relatively easy to be implemented by operation team.  In order to 
carry out this task, a PE fund may have to introduce external resources to bridge the 
“gap” at the invested company.  These gaps could be deficiencies in human resources, 
technical expertise for technology upgrades/transfers, and/or in re-establishing 
sales/distribution channels, re-design the process of new product development. 
 The “bottom-line initiative” approach means that investors would focus on 
productivity and efficiency issues: 1) supply chain management, 2) overhead reduction, 
3) process efficiency (e.g., process reengineering), 4) working capital reduction, 5) capex 
reduction, and 6) other cost reductions.  To control and minimize operational risks 
(such as legal and financial), PE funds may also help the acquired firm to establish and 
strictly enforce an internal control system, and re-organize business units.  Depending 
upon the specific needs and its corporate culture of the acquired company, PE funds 
would gradually introduce best practices and management systems.  For example, 
introduction of lean manufacturing and six sigma concepts together with restructuring 
incentive/compensation systems.  Other areas of concentration would be 
implementation of work-floor management, supply chain management covering supplier 
evaluation/development, technical training/support, and assessment.  Introduction of 
information systems such as the Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system would be a 
highly desirable initiative to improve productivity. 
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4.4.3 Capability of Deal Structuring 
Proposition 3---A well-designed deal structure will increase the probability of 
financial success for private equity transactions. 
The objective of a proper deal structure is to balance the investor’s risk and return 
consideration.  It implies thoughtful selection of a co-investor, if any, and to set up a 
meaningful control mechanism.  Ultimately, PE investors can achieve win-win results 
for parties involved in the transaction.  This process involves 1) determining the 
objective of the transaction, 2) designing the deal structure (based on 
communication/negotiation between investors and the company), 3) managing or co-
managing (if co-investors present), and 5) transaction close. 
These simple steps seem to be unimportant at the beginning of a transaction, but 
they could be a deciding factor leading to success or failure of the investment.  For 
example, in the case of the GMM deal, the original owner of the company wanted to 
retain a small portion of ownership percentage in the new company, but the 
buyer/investor did not agree with this request.  It turns out to be a right decision on the 
part of the private equity investor.  Had the seller retained some equity in the company, 
many HR issues could not be resolved due to the SOE history.    
4.4.4 Capability of Investment Exit 
Proposition 4---Capability of investment exit would be the last but not least critical 
step.  Investment return will not be realized unless it is done properly. 
The predetermined fund life cycle at private equity firms requires the fund to exit all 
of its investments before the end of fund life.  By default, private equity funds must 
consider exit events at the beginning of an investment.  Typically, halfway through the 
fund life cycle, a private equity firm will actively mobilize a variety of resources to work 
on the contemplated investment exit process.  This process involves: 1) design of the 
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deal structure at the time of investment, 2) work closely with investment bankers, 
brokers/intermediaries, 3) network with potential able buyers, and 4) design incentive 
structure for the management team for the exit event. 
4.4.5 TMT Role at the Deal Level 
Proposition 5--- TMT is important for every phase of the investment process at the 
private equity firms.  Without a capable TMT identified and assembled, no financial 
return can be expected. 
As previously discussed, there is a need to understand human capital expertise that 
successful private equity firm requires.  There have been no systematic studies of the 
relationship between human capital factors and financial returns (Cumming, Siegel, and 
Wright 2007).  An attempt to study the relations of the demographic characteristics of 
deal manager and members of the operation committee with organizational behavior 
and performance, and the process and mechanism of how the functional relations work 
would be highly desirable.  
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4.5 T-SOSE Model (Capacities at Deal Level) 
Figure 3 T-SOSE Model (Capacities at Deal Level) 
 
Figure 3 shows the proposed T-SOSE model for private equity firms at the deal level.  
As indicated, deal-selection/screening, operational-improvement, deal-structuring, and 
investment-exit capabilities are all centered around the TMT.  TMT is impacting every 
phase of the investment process.  This T-SOSE model can be utilized in analyzing private 
equity investments.  The proposed T-SOSE model assumes 1) private equity firm is 
actively pursuing its financial goals and 2) there is no major uncontrollable industry 
downturns in the sectors invested by the private equity firm.         
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CHAPTER 5 
ZHENGZHOU SIWEI (ZHSW) CASE 
5.1 Transaction Participants and Process 
Potential buyer: QDUS is a leading buyout fund specializing in middle-market 
transactions with a head office in the United States. 
Ultimate buyer: Caterpillar Inc. (CAT) is a leading global manufacturer of mining 
and construction machinery. 
Seller: ZHSW is a privately owned Chinese manufacturer of hydraulic roof support 
located in Zhengzhou, Henan Province, China.  It was ranked the top three maker in the 
Chinese hydraulic roof market in 2008. 
Figure 4 Investment Process of CAT into ZHSW    
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
5.2 Description of the Transaction 
Typically, coal mines in China utilize “3+1” sets of equipment as a “comprehensive 
solution” for the underground coal mining activities.  This comprehensive solution 
includes road header (RH) used to bore tunnels in coal mine, shearer used to cut coal  
seam, armored faced conveyor (AFC) to transport coal, and hydraulic roof support 
(HRS) to avoid falling of the coal seam at the working face.   
In Oct. 2006, ZHSW began 
to cross sell its products 
with GMM as a supplier of 
the hydraulic roof support 
system. 
In May 2007, 
GMM negotiated 
with ZHSW for a 
potential buyout 
deal. 
In March 2008, GMM 
gave up the potential 
acquisition of ZHSW 
for valuation and 
accounting issues. 
In September 2010, 
ZHSW was listed in 
Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange via reverse 
takeover of ERA, a listed 
company in HK. 
In Jan. 2013, CAT 
announced a write-
down of USD $580 
million of ERA’s 
assets. 
In June 2012, CAT 
acquired ERA with 
a valuation up to 
USD $886 million. 
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GMM, as a maker of AFC, shearer and road header, teamed up with ZHSW to 
provide a total solution to coal mine customers.  Coming from one supplier will save 
trouble from customers if there are issues with the interworking of the complete system.  
Therefore, engineers at GMM and ZHSW worked side by side to make sure that the 
complete system would work in tandem at the underground working face.  Through this 
close working relationship, GMM and ZHSW started discussion on a possible acquisition 
of ZHSW.  With the help of QDUS, GMM started the process of an operational, 
financial, and tax due diligence investigation on ZHSW.  
However, the outcome of the due diligence investigation showed that there were 
issues regarding revenue recognition practice and inventory valuation.  These issues, if 
not resolved, could be deal breakers.  Based on this discovery, GMM evaluated the 
business at a much lower enterprise value than that of ZHSW shareholders who were 
willing to sell.  Neither side was willing to compromise.  As a result, GMM had to 
terminate the discussion on possible acquisition.  About a year later, ZHSW went public 
through a reverse merger process with ERA which is a publically traded company listed 
on the GEM board at the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.   
In November 2011, CAT acquired ERA through a public to private transaction which 
valued ERA up to USD $886 million.  Consequently, ERA/ZHSW became a private 
company after the transaction.  This transaction would expand and boost CAT’s 
presence in the Chinese coal mining machinery market according to the press release 
published by CAT when it announced the transaction to the general public. 
5.3 Outcome of CAT’s Acquisition of ZHSW 
A few months after the close of the transaction, CAT announced that a write-off of 
over USD $580 million of ZHSW value in January 2013, which was nearly 70% of the 
total transaction value in June, 2012. 
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5.3.1 What Went Wrong on This Well-Publicized Transaction?   
According to the news report by Reuters (John 2013), “when it bought ZHSW, CAT 
had been doing business in China for more than 30 years.  It had amassed 20,000 
China employees, dozens of manufacturing, research, logistics and parts centers and a 
broad dealer network.  It had nine new facilities under construction, and had just 
completed the $8.8 billion purchase of Bucyrus, a mining and earth-moving company 
with significant China operations”.   
For years CAT has been trying to get into the underground coal mining equipment 
market in China.  However, the product offering from CAT did not fit well with the 
underground long-wall mining conditions for most Chinese coal mines.  Thus, the 
acquisition of Bucyrus International in September 2010, which is a global market leader 
in underground coal mining equipment, provided CAT with a unique opportunity to tap 
into the lucrative and fast-growing market in China’s coal mine boom.      
Bucyrus had been working with ZHSW for years prior to its acquisition by CAT.  
Hence, executives at the firm felt that they knew ZHSW well.  According to people who 
are familiar with the situation, “the operating executives feel that they know everything 
there is to know about ZHSW since they have been working with them over years on 
product development, technology transfer.  The two firms even teamed up in overseas 
bidding projects”.  When the acquisition of Bucyrus by CAT was completed, executives 
in charge of this transaction at CAT relied heavily on the input and feedback from the ex-
Bucyrus operating executives who claimed they knew everything about the company.  
This overconfidence leads to a rushed due diligence investigation process.  To make 
things worse, the rules at the Hong Kong Stock Exchange also contribute to this quick 
and dirty due diligence investigation.  In Hong Kong, a potential investor into a 
publically traded company must disclose whatever they find during the due diligence 
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investigation to the general public.  This particular requirement made it difficult for the 
potential investor to do a thorough and complete due diligence investigation without 
causing the fluctuation of the stock price.  The third issue is that many Chinese 
companies obtained its listing in Hong Kong through a “reverse merger” process.  This 
is a process whereby a private company buys a shell company that is already listed and 
injects its assets into the shell.  By doing so, the private business can allegedly avoid the 
regulatory scrutiny typically involved in the initial public offering process.   
On one hand, as the buyer, CAT accused that ZHSW had engaged in “deliberate, 
multi-year, coordinated accounting misconduct” by the management, which led to a 
huge loss of CAT’s equity interest in ZHSW.  On the other hand, the seller (original 
owner of ZHSW) argued that they had cooperated fully with CAT during the due 
diligence process prior to the close of the transaction.  CAT did not raise any questions 
regarding ZHSW’s accounting practice which has been remained unchanged throughout 
this period of time.  
I interviewed a former ZHSW executive and learned that “CAT was very busy with 
the acquisition/post-acquisition integration of Bucyrus at the time.  Transaction of 
ZHSW was not high on anybody’s priority list.  Consequently, the transaction team 
members were pressured to close the deal within a short period of time.  They 
(transaction professionals) just walked the floor and asked a few questions because they 
felt that the ex-Bucyrus operation executives already knew all the details of the company.  
Therefore, there [was] no need for them to dig further into the operations”.  However, 
contrary to what CAT believes, former executives at ZHSW acknowledged that its 
accounting and finance teams were inexperienced, but denies fraud according to news 
reports later. 
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5.4 Case Discussion 
It is not uncommon for buyers and sellers to start pointing fingers at each other 
when things go wrong.  However, the fact is that CAT did not conduct a thorough 
financial/operational due diligence on ZHSW as it should have before it closed the 
transaction.  It may be because the transaction team, supported by the operation 
executives, believed that it was unlikely to encounter financial inappropriateness with a 
publically traded company in Hong Kong.  It also seems CAT, as a strategic investor, 
might be too eager to acquire ZHSW because of the fear that competitors had moved into 
the Chinese market already.  If they do not move aggressively and quickly, they would 
be left behind. Based on this line of reasoning, CAT not only acquired the company in a 
rush, but also paid a huge premium over its market price.   
In the J&J transaction, QDUS spent almost a year trying to negotiate with the 
provincial SASAC to resolve the gap between two different accounting systems adopted 
by J&J and International Accounting Standards.  When QDUS was discussing possible 
acquisition of ZHSW, different accounting treatments were the major deal breakers.  
Failing to reach an agreement with the seller, QDUS decided to walk away.  It seems 
that managers of private equity firms are “less likely to overpay and hence more likely to 
walk away from a deal than managers from public firms” (Bargeron, Stulz, and Zutter 
2007). 
In the propositions/T-SOSE model derived from the case discussion of GMM, one of 
the five critical capabilities at the private equity fund is deal selection/screening.  
Choosing a right industry and target company are the most important tasks.  When we 
look at the ZHSW transaction, CAT has the required industry knowledge and operating 
expertise through Bucyrus acquisition.  However, somehow it overlooked at the 
operating details at the target company.  CAT assumed everything was fine until it 
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discovered problems.  Some of the issues claimed by CAT do not seem to be trivial, for 
example, inventory discrepancies.  The hydraulic roof support is a product with a huge 
physical size.  Unlike bolts and nuts, it is very easy to account for them if one chooses to 
do so. 
When QDUS was doing due diligence work on ZHSW, the transaction team 
members spent two months at the site, verifying and reconciling the book with physical 
inventory.  The team members even dug into warehouse receipts and transportation 
records to verify revenue numbers.  There are many unpleasant, but necessary 
encounters where the seller cannot provide sufficient evidence to support its claim.  
Instead of a confirmatory due diligence, QDUS’s due diligence at ZHSW turned out to be 
more of a discovery nature. 
This deal-selection/screening capability at QDUS made it walk away from the deal 
whereas the lack of such capability at CAT caused its financial loss.  This illustrates the 
importance of the deal-selection/screening capability to the success or failure of the 
investment.  Having such a capability may not be a sufficient condition for investment 
success, but it is a necessary condition.  
The other issue is the TMT capability.  CAT, during its evaluation of the target 
company, failed to identify and assess the top management team at ZHSW.  As 
acknowledged by the former ZHSW executive, the accounting and finance team is 
technically incompetent.  It is surprising that CAT went ahead and closed the 
transaction without fixing the deficiency.  One of the possible explanations is that CAT 
did not even know this deficiency at ZHSW before the problem surfaced later. 
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Chapter 6 
INTERVIEWED CASES 
6.1 Overview of Interviews 
Table 9 Overview of Interviews
Firm1 Fund size 
(USD MM) 
Title of informants Number of 
Interviews 
 Fund origin 
QDC 1,500 Managing Director 3 US 
SLE 180 Partner in Charge 3 China 
BGC 75 Partner 2 US 
NHJ 1,200 Partner  2 US & China 
JLC 1650 Partner 2 China 
TTC 680 Operating partner 4 Europe 
In order to gain a broader and deeper understanding, I interviewed six PE funds 
that are operating in China.  Table 9 shows the overview of the six PE funds 
interviewed.  The type of funds interviewed ranges from buyout to growth capital.  
While the fund size ranges from $75 to $1.65 billion US dollars, the origin of the funds 
ranges from US/Europe-based to China-based.  With this diverse background of funds, 
it provides an overview of the transactions regardless of the type, size of fund, and its 
country of origin. 
6.2 Basic Information of the Interviewed Companies 
Appendix CTable 21 shows the industry sector, deal size, equity ownership 
percentage, holding period, and exit status of each of the interviewed companies.  The 
industry sector includes hardware, automotive parts, chemical products, consumer 
products, travel services, subway system designs, healthcare products and services, 
                                                        
1 Name of funds are pseudonym 
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telecommunication, media, and technology.  This diverse industry selection was 
intended to adjust systematic risk in specific industry and business cycles.  Due to the 
early stage of the private equity industry development in China, many of these 
investments have not been exited by its investors.      
Appendix C Table 22 shows the investor’s control mechanism, value-added activities 
provided, if any, typical quote from the informants, lessons learned, and the estimated 
investment return.  It is worth noting that the control mechanism (i.e. full/partial 
control vs. veto) does not seem to correlate positively with the estimated investment 
return. 
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Table 10 Capabilities and Investment Return
 
Firm 
Deal Screening Operational 
improvement 
Deal 
Structuring 
Equity Exit Estimated IRR 
 MKT TMT 
Successful 
Cases 
LTBF 1 1 1 1 10% 1 60% 
NQP 1 1 1 1 30% 1 45% 
YTS 1 1 0 1 10% 1 43% 
BCT 1 1 1 1 15% 1 38% 
LTS 1 1 1 1 7% 1 36% 
LBYQ 1 1 0 1 15% 1 34% 
LQP 1 1 1 1 10% 1 32% 
BHCP 1 1 1 1 15% NA 25% 
NDS 1 1 0 1 5% NA 23% 
BHCS 1 1 1 1 10% NA 22% 
Borderline 
Cases 
LYJG -1 -1 1 1 30% 1 17% 
TOG -1 -1 1 1 100% NA 15% 
NXF -1 -1 1 1 60% NA 13% 
YRS -1 -1 0 -1 5% 1 12% 
Failed Cases TVM -1 -1 1 1 100% NA Negative 
LNM -1 -1 -1 -1 10% NA Negative 
THW 1 -1 -1 -1 70% NA Negative 
TCP 1 -1 -1 1 100% NA Negative 
1= Active action, positive effect; 0=No action; -1= Active or passive action, negative effect. 
5
8
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6.3 Cross-Case Analysis and Discussion 
In the previous discussion on the GMM case, I suggested five propositions that 
include: 1) deal-selection/screening capability, 2) operation-improvement capability, 3) 
deal-structuring capability, 4) investment-exit capability, and 5) TMT capability.  I now 
use these five propositions to analyze the findings from the cases presented in this study.  
6.3.1 Deal-Selection/Screening Capability 
Proposition 1---Deal selection/screening is the most important step in the value-
creation process by private equity firm, if not done well, investment performance will 
suffer. 
From Table 10, observations can be made that all successful cases have done a good 
job in the deal-selection/screening process without exception.  Investors, including co-
investors, not only identified and pursued the right market/industry sectors/target 
company relative to its knowledge and experience, but also identified/assembled right 
Top Management Team (TMT) at the company.   
TMT members could come from within the fund, from its co-investors, and/or from 
outside service providers.  For example, in the case of LTBF, SLE (PE fund) spent 
almost two years working with the company on strategic consulting engagements.  At 
the time the company wanted to change its business model from selling its product 
indirectly through a trading company to direct sales to its customers.  Because the 
industry network SLE had, the partner at the fund took the company directly to its global 
customers.  The company could not do this on its own because of its product-quality 
issue and lack of communication skill.   
By means of strategic consulting engagement, SLE was able to demonstrate its 
value-added capability to the company.  Consequently, the PE fund was later invited to 
invest in the company.  In addition, the PE fund was able to beat the competition from 
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other potential investors who lack the industry knowledge.  Selection of this particular 
target company to invest is a result of industry knowledge, experience of the private 
equity fund, and close working relationship established prior to the investment decision 
being made.  Through this close working relationship, the investor was able to observe 
and identify TMT members at the company.   
BHCS is another example.  BHCS is a service company that provides installation 
maintenance service on imported medical equipment at Chinese hospitals.  As the living 
standard improved, many Chinese hospitals imported medical equipment from GE and 
other healthcare service equipment makers.  Typically, after one year of service 
warranty, the foreign equipment manufacturers do not provide service or maintenance 
on the equipment sold due to cost considerations.  Therefore, there is a market need for 
local Chinese companies to provide such a service.  BHCS is a company started by a 
group of former GE healthcare professionals who have the knowledge of the imported 
equipment as well as the need at Chinese hospitals.  The company has revenue of over 
RMB 500 million, has installed 20,000 pieces of equipment at over 10,000 hospitals in 
China during the last 10 years.  BGC invests into the company because of its industry 
knowledge and resources in the health care industry in the US and European markets.  
The investment theme from BGC is that if the BHCS can grow to certain scale, there are 
many smaller foreign health care equipment makers that need service/maintenance 
people on the ground in China to serve their products in the fast-growing Chinese 
market.   
“We have a lot resources in [the] US and Europe that we can bring to those small 
and mid-sized companies that sell their products to China,” said the BGC partner 
interviewed.   
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The CEO at BHCS does not speak English, so he cannot really talk directly to the US 
companies by himself.  Therefore, the fund partner took the CEO and his senior 
managers to the US and visited many companies in five cities.  The target US companies 
are not as big as GE, but they are still publically traded companies.  They used 
distributors in China in the past, but have no idea of how their equipment is being served 
in China.  They definitely need this service.   
“We add value by opening up new customers bases for BHCS in [the] US and 
Europe,” said the BGC partner.   
The GMM case also illustrate this point.  When QDUS considers the investment 
into GMM, it does not have industry knowledge in the coal mine equipment industry 
within the fund infrastructure.  However, it does have experience in the industrial 
equipment manufacturing space.  In addition, one of the partners from its co-investor is 
an industry insider, who has over 30 years of experience in the coal mine equipment 
sector.  Furthermore, QDUS also hires a former executive who is experienced in the 
heavy machinery making from working at a US-based multinational company.  This 
collective industry knowledge and expertise from the investor group helped QDUS select 
the GMM investment opportunity.  GMM also shows the screening capability at work in 
understanding the target company before the investment is made.  QDUS spent almost 
a year doing due diligence work at the company, identifying potential risks and 
formulating strategies and tactics to minimize the risks.  This effort before investment 
enables QDUS avoid any unexpected surprises once it takes over the operations at the 
company.   
On the other hand, almost all the failed cases did not do a good job in the deal-
selection/screening process.  They either did not select/screen the right 
industry/sector/target company, or did not have the right TMT line up for operation.  
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In the case of TVM, for example, QDC (PE fund) is an experienced investor in China with 
a dozen successful investments in heavy industry manufacturing sector.  However, TVM 
is a cable TV advertisement consolidation play, which is an unfamiliar industry to the 
fund.  Without much of industry knowledge and expertise from within, the fund has to 
rely on the entrepreneur/founder for operation.  Because of competitive forces from 
other potential investors, the fund rushed into the transaction, did not have a thorough 
due diligence investigation conducted on the background of the CEO, who turned out to 
be someone not trustworthy and had integrity issues in the past. “Had we known the 
background of the CEO, we would have not invested into this company,” the fund 
partner later commented.   
Furthermore, in the case of THW, the investor seems to have identified the right 
industry, but failed to assemble the right TMT at the company.  The investor recruited 
an experienced CEO from an industry leader to run a small family business.  Even 
though the CEO is an industry expert, he cannot work well with the 
founder/entrepreneur, who is still a minority shareholder at the company.  This conflict 
and incompatibility of management style created a huge turnover of management 
personnel at the company.  Thus, the financial performance of the company was 
negatively impacted.  
From the discussion on ZHSW case in Chapter 5, we also find a similar situation 
with CAT.  CAT, as an experienced corporate acquirer, failed in the due diligence 
process.  Even though it acquired the necessary industry knowledge and operating 
expertise through the Bucyrus deal, it did not perform a thorough due diligence 
investigation, particularly in regard to revenue recognition and inventory issues.  The 
failure at deal screening caused the huge negative financial impact.    
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Through discussion of above examples, it appears that investors who do not have the 
capability or did not do well in the deal-selection/screening process, are very likely to 
experience negative financial consequences.  While proposition 1 alone is not a 
sufficient condition for financial success, it is a necessary condition for success.     
6.3.2 Operation-Improvement Capability 
Proposition 2---Private equity firms must provide value-added services on operation 
improvement at the invested company to create value. Financial engineering alone 
cannot generate the expected financial return. 
Looking at the proposition 2, operation-improvement capability, proposed by this 
paper, there are also some interesting observations to be made.  For all of the successful 
cases, investors, after the first important step is done right, also actively provide value-
added services to the invested company in operational improvement.  These services 
include, but are not limited to, strategic consulting, global network and resources, 
sales/marketing expansion activities to reach broader geographic coverage, introduction 
of new technology, improvement on product quality, implementation of more 
transparent and efficient systems, providing finance/accounting and legal compliance 
support, etc.   
For example, LTBF is a privately owned chemical company producing chemical 
additives.  Upon investment, PE funds recommended two retired industry/operational 
experts who have been working for the global chemical companies for decades.   
Right after joining the company, the two experts started to lead the company toward 
working on its products’ quality, technology and process improvement, expanding 
production capacity from 100 MT/year to 200 MT/year.  All of a sudden, with the 
improved product quality and production process and capacity, the revenue at the  
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company dramatically increased and moved from being a second-tier player to number 
two in the industry.      
As the company continues to improve, with the help of the two experts, it also turns 
product waste into a new product offering.  Thus, the company becomes an 
environmentally friendly operation.  This effort not only increases revenue by adding 
new products, but also saves on the cost of industrial waste treatment.   
According to the partner at the fund, “we added value in providing [a] global vision 
for the company, [led] the quality and process improvement efforts, changed product 
waste into new product offering, trained mid-level management team”. 
Another example is BCT, which is the largest Chinese refrigerated trucking 
company.  BGC (PE fund) and its co-investor, which is a US-based industry player 
invested into this young Chinese company based out of the Henan province.  Investors 
helped the company design product, with its production process, and also sent an 
American engineer to work at the Chinese company in the Henan province for an 
extended period of time. “We are not just putting in money and [attending] board 
meetings, or being an advisor only, we actually roll up our sleeves and work side by side 
with employees at the company,” said the fund partner interviewed.  In addition to help 
on product and process design, BGC also helped the company on quality assurance and 
even install an ERP system at the company to improve productivity.  As a result of this 
effort by investors, the revenue at the company tripled in a period of 3 years. 
In addition to capital contribution, active private equity investors also provide 
value-added services on operational improvement to the invested company.  A study 
(Acharya, Hahn, and Kehoe 2009) shows that value-added services would be in different 
forms or formats.  “Top-line initiative” and “bottom-line initiative” are common 
approaches.  While the “top-line initiative” approach means that investors would focus 
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on new products, new channels, new geographies, existing geographies, and existing 
customers; the “bottom-line initiative” approach means that the investors would focus 
on helping 1) supply chain management, 2) overhead reduction, 3) process efficiency 
(e.g., process reengineering), 4) working capital reduction, 5) capex reduction, and 6) 
other cost reduction.  
My findings show that, more often than not, the invested company would embrace 
the “top-line initiative” approach easier and quicker because it instantly enhances 
revenue.  However, it might be difficult for the “bottom-line initiative” approach to be 
implemented promptly since it involves changing the existing processes, introducing a 
more rigorous quality control mechanism and more efficient process layout, cost cutting, 
etc.  This phenomena is also evidenced by a research study (Kester and Luehrman 
1995), which observes that private equity investment in the US has become more closely 
associated with seeking growth opportunities than with cost reduction and asset 
stripping.    
It is this type of value-added activities that helped the invested company grow to the 
next level of corporate development.  Investors, in the meantime, earned sincere 
appreciation from the founder/entrepreneur.   
The four borderline cases illustrated in Table 10 show some interesting 
characteristics.  Shortly after an investment is made from investors, some unexpected 
changes occurred, either in market or with TMT members.  In the case of TOG, the 
company is a market leader in the US for CNG and LNG regulators.  TTC (PE fund) 
invested into this company in anticipation of the explosive growth opportunity for LNG 
usage in China.  For this reason, investors paid a premium for the company and 
overlooked product design and quality problems discovered during the due diligence 
investigation.  When the oil and gas market collapsed during the last two to three years, 
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the anticipated market boom for LNG usage in China did not occur.  To make things 
worse, the product quality issue became serious with Chinese customers.  The CEO and 
management team did not find the root cause of the problem.  Instead of improving its 
quality, the management team blamed customers for not properly installing its product 
during the application process.  The CEO brought in by the investor used to work for big 
multinational companies, but was not well experienced in working with a smaller 
company that did not have depth of the management team.  The management team is 
trying to work hard in the operational-improvement area.  This investment almost 
becomes a turn-around situation.   
The other three cases (LYJG, NXF, and YRS) have almost a similar situation in that 
with a misjudgment of the market, unexpected behavior, and/or change of TMT 
members, the expected return on investment did not turn out to be what investors 
anticipated.   
YRS is a subway rail system design company.  The company is an SOE and a 
dominant player in its market niche.  When invested into YRS, JLC (PE fund) expects 
market growth opportunities due to the government-led infrastructure building boom of 
subway systems throughout cities in China.  When structuring this investment, JLC can 
only invest and own 5% of equity at the company without a board representation.  
Therefore, JLC has on influence on the management decision or veto power.   
The management team at the company is solid, operationally.  Yet, as a SOE, there 
is no meaningful incentive system in place at the company.  One year after JLC’s 
investment, the company went public in HK.  However, the company did not perform as 
well as it forecasted.  In addition, the expected market boom for the subway system 
building did not take place due to the austerity measures taken by the government on 
infrastructure projects nationwide and general economic slowdown.  
 67 
As a minority investor without board representation, JLC can only provide value-
added activities during the IPO process because the management team is not familiar 
with the capital market.     
“We view YRS investment as a pure financial play.  To us, this is a mature business 
with a proven business model.  We think the management team is solid and know their 
business.  However, we misjudged the market demand and made a mistake by 
accepting no veto power arrangement,” said the fund partner interviewed. 
This case demonstrates both proposition 1 & 3 (capabilities of deal selection and 
deal structuring) are important factors for investment return considerations.  As a PE 
investor, if you do not have the knowledge of the sector in which the target company is 
operating, and have no control mechanism to influence the management decision when 
you structure the deal, it would be better off killing the deal and walking away. 
NXF is in a very similar situation.  NXF is a company that is in the consumer 
product business.  When NHJ (PE fund) invested into the company, they expected 
growth opportunities for its products.  However, the unexpected change of market and 
the underperformance of the CEO made the investment suffer. 
“We were dragged into being a majority shareholder.  The combination of 
unexpected market changes and the underperformance of the CEO put our investment 
return below our expectation,” said the fund manager interviewed.    
The LYJG case is a different example.  The company is a startup by a group of 
former executives at a multinational chemical company.  These executives are 
technically competent.  The product at the company is “Sealant Glue”, which is a 
chemical additive with a 70% margin.  When it starts, the company does not have its 
own manufacturing facility but outsources its production.   
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Shortly after the SLE (PE fund) invested into LYJG, the management team decided 
to build a factory and started to make a product to compete with its customer despite the 
advice from the PE investor. 
 “We strongly [recommended the] CEO do not get into competition with its 
customers.  Despite our advice, the company went to compete directly with its 
customers.  As a result, it suffered [a] huge loss of revenue on its core products,” said 
the fund partner interviewed. 
The fund partner had to jump in to help run the company as a temporary CEO.  
This investment ended up as a turn-around situation.  “If we did not have industry 
knowledge or operation experience, we could not [have saved] the company.  
Unwillingly, we became the largest shareholder in the business.”   
The founders at the company are very competent engineers.  For instance, they 
make a production line, which costs RMB 1 million, but the similar German-made 
production line would have costed Euro 1 million.  “We overlooked the team.  We 
should have paid more attention to leadership and business acumen in addition to the 
technical capability,” said the fund partner.   
“Looking back at this company, we did not have a thorough understanding of the 
business and its people.  We [felt] comfortable with the business because we [knew] the 
industry, but [ignored] the top management team members and their capabilities, 
especially their business acumen,” according to the fund partner.  
 The cases of LYJG and NXF show that propositions 1 & 5 are closely related to the 
investment return expected by the investors.  Missing one of these capabilities would 
lead to financial difficulties.  
Interestingly enough the investors in all four cases stick to their underperforming 
deals at this moment hoping they can make a turn around and earn a decent return on 
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their investments.  This occurrence of “stick to dogs” is also evidenced by (Acharya, 
Hahn, and Kehoe 2009).  The above cases show the importance of both selecting a right 
industry and assemble the right TMT at the invested company simultaneously.  These 
two factors are equally important first steps for a successful investment project.   
This again illustrated that proposition 1 (deal-selection/screening) capability at the 
investor level is critical to the success or failure of the investment performance.  While 
deal-selection/screening capability alone does not guarantee a successful investment 
return, it is the most important step that investors cannot afford to not do right.  This 
also illustrated the critical role of the TMT at each company.     
The failed cases of TCP, LVM, TVM, and THW also show some interesting traits.  
In the case of TCP, the company has been in the automotive parts business, but also 
engaged in electronics (cellphone and notebook) manufacturing and distribution 
business.  When TTC (PE investor) decides to move TCP to Asia due to the fact that 
70% sales are from Asia, it also wants to take advantage of growth opportunities in Asia 
by implementing a roll-up strategy.   
While the strategy seems plausible, it has to let go of the Europe-based top 
management team and move its head office to Asia.  Obviously, TTC has to localize the 
top management team, recruiting local management talents to run the business.  When 
the 2008 financial crisis came, the electronic business at the company suffered, gross 
margin was down by 50%, and top management team members, including CEO, CFO, 
and others changed too many times.  Each time a newly hired CEO brought in a 
different mid-level management team.  While the TMT became a revolving door, the 
company also implemented its roll-up strategy, acquiring other smaller competitors.   
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“[The] strategy to relocate to Asia is successful, but [the] change of people [in the] 
top management team made the business [suffer],” according to the fund partner 
interviewed.       
TTC did not provide any value-added services to the invested company because it 
does not have the infrastructure in-house.  It has to fully rely on outside assistance.  
The investor does not communicate with the TMT on critical operating issues in a timely 
manner.  As a result, by the time the investor finds out things went wrong at the 
company, it is often too late to do anything.  Then, the investor replaces the CEO and 
other senior executives in the hope that the company would get back on track.  Because 
of this hands-off approach adopted by the investor, the TMT becomes a revolving door.  
Key management positions were changed numerous times and the company is struggling 
in the marketplace.  
Another failed case, this time with LNM, may also illustrate this point.  LNM is a 
company that makes plastic pipes used for oil drilling and exploration applications.  
The technology is a special PVC pipe extrusion at near-melting point.  Inserting this 
inner pipe inside a steel pipe increases the speed of oil flow.  Obviously, there is a huge 
market for this product.  It is also good for defense applications because it makes pipes 
portable.   
This technology is verified by the German market leader.  SLE (PE fund) invested 
into the company valued at eight times the net profit.  One month after its investment, a 
competitor (a SOE fund) invested in the company valued at 13 times the net profit.   
Since SLE does not have the industry knowledge, it has to rely solely on the 
company CEO and its team for operation.  Since its investment, the SOE fund has tried 
to kick out the SLE, but the co-investors fight with each other.  SLE tries to offer 
assistance, but the company CEO and its team ignore them.   
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“There [have been] no board meetings since we invested.  We tried to ask them to 
buy back our equity without success.  It has been three years so far.  We are not able to 
get our investment back.  We, in fact, write it off,” said the SLE partner interviewed. 
The cases of TCP and LNM illustrate proposition 1 (deal selection/screening) & 5 
(TMT) at work.  In the case of TCP, the investor failed to identify and assemble a TMT 
that can run the business and implement and support its strategic initiatives.  In the 
case of LNM, the investor failed at the deal-selection process, as well as in identifying the 
right TMT member (co-investor).  Both investments turned into financial loss for the 
investors.  
In general, investors need to make sure that they invest in an industry that they 
know inside and out.  If the investors do not have the required industry knowledge, they 
should seek help from other sources.  In addition, they also have to make sure that top 
management teams at the company are solid so that the execution would be carried out 
without much outside assistance.  Depending on the specific company situation, 
investors could help with the operational-improvement initiatives at the company, if 
needed. 
The cases of LBYQ, NDS, and YTS are exceptions.  Investors did not provide much 
value-added services because the TMT at the company are competent and operationally 
solid.  Therefore, there is no need for the investors to jump in and offer operational 
support.  However, these cases show that propositions 1, 3, 4, and 5 are at work.   
Findings from the above examples show that the operational-improvement 
capability from the investor would help greatly with the expected financial return of the 
investment.  In the early days of the private equity industry, pure financial engineering 
maneuvers were sufficient to earn investors a good return on their investment.  
Therefore, the operational-improvement capability may not be as important then as it is 
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now due to increased competition amongst private equity firms.  With the low-hanging 
fruits taken, private equity firms nowadays must work hard to provide value-added 
services to its invested companies in addition to its capital investment.   
6.3.3 Deal-Structuring Capability 
Proposition 3---A well-designed deal structure will increase the probability of 
financial success for private equity transactions. 
Looking at proposition 3 suggested by this paper---deal-structuring capability 
means investment ownership, control mechanism, and tax planning in this context.   
As illustrated in Table 10, it is interesting to note how the control mechanism at 
work is a minority investor.  According to one fund partner, “we can never force the 
entrepreneur/founder to do anything if he does not want to, all we can do is to stop him 
from doing something since we have the veto right, i.e. negative control.”  
Consequently, more often than not, CEOs may reject the competent professionals that 
investors recommend be added to the TMT.  In this case, investors need to keep trying 
until an acceptable professional is found and accepted by the CEO/entrepreneur. “We 
will keep trying until we succeed,” said the partner interviewed.    
In contrast to perceived wisdom, in all of the successful cases listed in Table 10 
investors do not have any controlling equity stake, which seems to suggest that the 
ownership percentage does not matter much relative to financial performance.  Their 
ownership percentage ranges from 5% to 30%, which are typical minority/growth capital 
investments, not buyout transactions.  However, each investor has an effective control 
mechanism (veto power) with the invested company.  Despite being a minority investor, 
every case demonstrated decent financial returns. 
On the other hand, in the cases of TVM and TCP, even though the investors have 
100% ownership and full operational control, they still failed miserably.  This indicates 
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that the deal-structuring capability, i.e. ownership percentage and control mechanism, 
are only meaningful if and when investors have selected the right industry to invest, and 
was able to provide value-added services to the invested company.  The findings of both 
TVM and TCP cases support this point.       
6.3.4 Investment-Exit Capability 
Proposition 4---Capability of investment exit would be the last but not least critical 
step.  Investment return will not be realized unless it is done properly. 
Investment-exit capability means that investors have the capability to help the 
invested companies with its network and resources when it exits the investment and earn 
a well-deserved financial return. 
Private equity is a young and growing industry in China.  As such, it has a history of 
less than 10 years.  Most, if not all, of the private equity firms are in their first fund 
cycle, i.e. raised capital, invested into project, but have not yet exited their investment.  
Therefore, there are only a few buyout transactions that can be studied in this setting.  
Most sample cases in this study are growth capital investments.  There are two possible 
explanations: 1) unlike mature private equity funds operating in the developed 
economies, most newly formed PE firms in China do not have an operation team at the 
fund level which can provide value-added services, 2) some private equity firms are pure 
financial investors who do not want to get involved in the operations of the company it 
invested.  While there are similarities between buyout and growth capital transactions, 
differences do exist.  The major difference is the influence from the fund to the invested 
companies.  Typically, the sponsor of the buyout transaction would have more influence 
on the portfolio company, while growth capital may only have veto power.  
Shown in Table 10, seven of the ten successful cases, demonstrate the investment-
exit capability to the investor.  For example, in the case of LTBF, the investor took the 
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leading role in promoting the company being listed since the management team at the 
company does not have any relevant experience or business network to satisfy the needs 
of the company.  In the case of NQP, the investor was also playing a critical role in the 
exit.  In fact, the original owner of the company accepted the investor mainly because of 
its business network and its reputation and skill set in the Chinese investment-banking 
world.  The YTS case displayed a similar, but slightly different flavor.  The original 
owner had to rely on the investor (PE fund) for a management incentive system design 
and business network for the initial public offering initiative.     
6.3.5 TMT Role at the Deal Level 
Proposition 5--- TMT is important for every phase of the investment process at the 
private equity firms.  Without a capable TMT assembled, no financial return can be 
expected.   
In every case observed above, the critical role of TMT at an invested company stands 
out.  Investors could have flawlessly completed the process in deal selection/screening, 
provided value-added services on operational improvement, and designed the 
appropriate deal structure and control mechanism, yet the investment may still fail due 
to the TMT issue.   
As discussed previously, TMT members include project leaders from the 
investor/co-investor, operating executives from the invested company, and/or executives 
from outside service providers.  Each capability at the investor has to be displayed by 
TMT members in executing the reformulated corporate strategy, achieving operational 
improvement, and ultimately delivering the financial performance expected by the 
investor.  From the case discussed above, observations can be made that each time 
there is a problem at the TMT level, no matter if it is a CEO, founder/entrepreneur, co- 
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investor, and/or other key TMT members, the financial performance/investment return 
will be compromised, if not failed.   
 
 
  
  
  
76  
Chapter 7 
CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 Conclusions 
Despite extensive research conducted on PE fund investments, it is surprising that 
so little research has actually been conducted on the value-creation process at the 
individual investment project level, which is the most basic unit of value creation.  The 
purpose of this study is to explore the process of value creation at the deal level and 
reveal the “secret recipe” of PE funds.  By studying the process of value creation, I hope 
to contribute to the existing literature in the following aspects: 
7.2 Contributions 
1. My findings show that value creation at the PE investment starts with deal 
selection/screening.  This capability at PE includes identifying the 
appropriate industry/sector and the target company.  Industry selection is a 
result of relevant industry knowledge and experience at the investor’s level.  
If such specific industry knowledge and experience is absent, then the PE 
investor should acquire it through its co-investor, and/or service providers.  
In addition, a complete and thorough due diligence investigation must be 
conducted.  The DD process should be more of a “discovery” rather than 
“confirmatory” in nature.  Investment decisions should not be made until 
investors feel completely comfortable with the target company and its 
management team.  Furthermore, identification and assessment of the TMT 
members at the target company also plays a critical role.  Without a capable 
TMT in place, PE firms will be better off walking away from the investment 
opportunity.   
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2. Secondly, my findings show that operational improvements led by PE firms 
are a major source of value creation for PE investments, particularly when 
financial leverage is not available (such as in China).  Operational 
improvements include revenue-enhancing initiatives and productivity-
boosting initiatives.  These types of value-added activities from the investor 
helped greatly with the expected financial return of the investment.  The 
capability of leading and executing operational improvements at the invested 
companies becomes a differentiating factor for PE firms.  Unlike the early 
days of the private equity industry when pure financial engineering 
maneuvers are sufficient enough to earn investors a good investment return, 
the operational-improvement capability becomes the core competency at PE 
firms now due to increased competition amongst private equity houses.  
With the low-hanging fruits taken, private equity firms nowadays must work 
hard to provide value-added services to its invested companies in addition to 
its capital investment.   
3. Thirdly, my study findings show that the ownership percentage does not 
seem to matter much relative to financial performance.  An effective control 
mechanism with the invested company is more important and meaningful.  
It is surprising to find that in all of the successful cases listed in Table 10 
investors do not have a controlling equity stake, but instead, each investor 
has an effective control mechanism (veto power) with the invested company.  
Despite being a minority investor, every case demonstrated decent financial 
returns.  
While a controlling equity stake may help the investor achieve its 
financial goals, it is not a guarantee for success.  In the cases of TVM and 
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TCP, even though the investors have 100% ownership and full control of the 
company, they still failed miserably.  This indicates that the deal-structuring 
capability, i.e. ownership percentage and control mechanism, are only 
meaningful if and when investors have selected the right industry and target 
company to invest, and are able to provide value-added services to the 
invested company.   
4. Fourthly, findings of this study also show that the investment-exit capability 
at the PE firm level also helps enhance financial success.  As shown in Table 
10, seven of the ten successful cases, demonstrate the investment-exit 
capability to the investor.  For example, in the case of LTBF, the investor 
took the leading role in promoting the company being listed since the 
management team at the company does not have any relevant experience 
and business network to satisfy the needs of the company.  In the case of 
NQP, the investor was also playing a critical role in the exit.  In fact, the 
original owner of the company accepted the investor mainly because of its 
business network and its reputation and skill set in the Chinese investment-
banking world.  The YTS case displayed a similar, but slightly different 
flavor.  The original owner has to rely on the investor (PE fund) for a 
management incentive system design and business network for the initial 
public offering initiative.     
5. Finally, in my previous discussion of the GMM case, I proposed the T-SESO 
model.  TMT capability is the center piece of this model surrounded by 
deal-selection/screening, operational-improvement, deal-structuring, and 
investment-exit capabilities.  My research findings show that the TMT 
factor impacts every stage of the investment process.  As discussed, the 
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TMT members include project leaders from the investor/co-investor, 
operating executives from the invested company, and/or executives from 
outside service providers.  Each capability for the investor has to be 
displayed by TMT members in executing the reformulated corporate 
strategy, achieving operational improvement, and ultimately delivering the 
financial performance expected by the investor.  Generalizations can be 
made that each time there is a problem at the TMT level, no matter if it is a 
CEO, founder/entrepreneur, co-investor, and/or other key TMT members, 
the financial performance/investment return will be compromised, if not 
failed.   
7.3 Limitations and Future Research 
As with all case study research, an important issue is the degree to which the 
findings are generalizable to a larger sample size.  This is ultimately an empirical 
question that will be answered only by further studies in the future.  However, a variety 
of indicators suggest that the findings of this study may be generalizable to other Chinese 
PE investment projects.  For example, like the cases in this study, the majority of the 
Chinese private equity funds are in its first fund cycle.  Therefore, the challenges faced 
by the PE firms are the same, i.e. deal selection/screening, operational improvement, 
deal structuring, investment exit, and identification and assembly of the TMT. 
While the findings of this study provide a meaningful and useful analytical 
framework for PE professionals for their investment activities, this study may also have 
inherent bias due to the small size of samples selected.  In addition, the data collected 
on estimated financial returns are estimated only.  It may or may not accurately reflect 
the real financial return of the studied investment projects.  Furthermore, as mentioned 
in the methodology section, the 20 cases included in this study are provided by six 
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different PE funds.  As such, some of investment projects by the same fund may carry 
the same investment philosophy and/or style which reflects the particular style of the 
investor.  Future studies with a larger pool of PE funds with audited financial and 
operating datasets may provide more solid evidence to test the propositions I suggested 
in this study.  PE funds, as a private entity, may or may not be willing to share their data 
publically due to their confidential obligations to their LPs.  Non-disclosure and privacy 
rules at the PE fund level presents a challenge to researchers on this subject.   
My case findings also suggest that the majority of investment types in this study 
coincide with the development stage of the PE funds investment in China.  During this 
stage of development, the growth capital investment is by far the major investment type 
whereas buyout transactions are still rare.  With the growth capital investment, the 
corporate control and governance issues become a critical factor impacting investment 
returns.  Findings from my study show that the growth capital type of investment in 
China is employing negative control, i.e. a veto power system to realize corporate 
governance and control purpose.  In reality, veto power, as the last resort in conflict 
resolution, may or may not be the best way to resolve a conflict in a corporate boardroom 
setting, especially in China where consensus building is a more dominant practice rooted 
in the Chinese culture.  Whenever veto power is used, it most likely creates a “hung 
jury” effect that would sacrifice efficiency in making decisions regarding corporate 
affairs.  Therefore, future studies on the relationship between ownership stake and 
control mechanism may provide some insight into the inner workings of the growth 
capital investment type.        
Future research should focus on SOE reform in China.  Even though my study on 
GMM shows that SOE reform can be successfully accomplished through a privatization 
process, many large SOE companies that operate in the “strategic” industries may or may 
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not be appropriate for this process due to national security concerns.  For example, 
telecommunication companies, oil and gas exploration, utility operators, and state 
electricity grids are a few such industries that are still monopolized and dominated by 
SOEs.  These companies are hardly profitable if all the government subsidies are taken 
away.  Reforming and revitalizing these SOEs will not only improve their operating 
efficiency, but also help the private companies who are suppliers or customers of these 
SOEs.  Therefore, the impact of SOE reform will have a ripple effect on the Chinese 
economy as a whole.      
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APPENDIX A 
IRR FROM INVESTMENT IN GMM VERSUS PME 
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Table 11 QDUS Cash Flow from Investment in GMM 
Date 
USD in mm 
Exit 
Equity %  
Notes Cash 
Outflow 
Cash 
Inflow 
Total 
Cash 
Flow 
12-Apr 
2006 
40.00   (40.00)  
Acquisition of J&J,RMB 
320mm, 1 USD=8.009 
RMB 
10-Sep 
2007 
1.60   (1.60)  
Acquisition of HNLW 
8-Nov 
2007 
8.46   (8.46)  
20-Nov 
2007 
0.03   (0.03)  
17-Dec 
2009 
 10.00  10.00  1.22% 
Redemption of preferred 
shares to QDUS before 
IPO; Market Cap=IPO 
price 4.88HK$ * 1,300 
mm shares/7.74 
HK$=USD 819.6mm 
23-Dec 
2009 
 33.40  33.40  4.08% 
10-Jan 
2010 
8.40   (8.40)  
Follow-up investment on 
HNLW, RMB57.5mm, 
1USD=6.82RMB 
10-Feb 
2010 
 103.50  103.50  12.63% 
Redemption of preferred 
shares and payments to 
QDUS through IPO 
14-Oct 
2010 
 133.11  133.11  13.46% 
Trade sale of 175mm 
shares*(closing price 
HK$6.55*90%)=1,031.625
mm HK$,1USD=7.75HK$ 
30-Dec 
2011 
 584.29  584.29  41.14% 
Exit from acquisition: 
534.8mm shares* 
8.5HK$=4,545.8mm HK$, 
1 USD=7.78 HK$ 
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Table 12 IRR Calculation Process for Investment in GMM 
Date 
QDUS 
Cash Flow (USD in mm) Exit Equity (%) 
12-Apr-2006 (40.00)  
10-Sep-2007 (1.60)  
8-Nov-2007 (8.46)  
20-Nov-2007 (0.03)  
17-Dec-2009 10.00 1.22% 
23-Dec-2009 33.40 4.08% 
10-Jan-2010 (8.40)  
10-Feb-2010 103.50 12.63% 
14-Oct-2010 133.11 13.46% 
30-Dec-2011 584.29  
IRR 80.40%  
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Table 13 PME Calculations for Shanghai Composite Index 
Date 
Shanghai Composite Index 
Index2 
Index 
performance 
Theoretical 
investment3       
(USD in 
mm) 
Shares 
number          
(in mm) 
Price per 
share                 
(in USD) 
Cash flow4      
(USD in
mm) 
12-Apr 
2006 
1,360  40.00 40.00 1.00 (40.00) 
10-Sep 
2007 
5,355 293.8% 159.10 40.41 3.94 (1.60) 
8-Nov 
2007 
5,330 -0.5% 166.82 42.56 3.92 (8.46) 
20-Nov 
2007 
5,293 -0.7% 165.68 42.57 3.89 (0.03) 
17-Dec 
2009 
3,179 -39.9% 98.30 42.05 2.34 1.21 
23-Dec 
2009 
3,073 -3.3% 91.15 40.34 2.26 3.87 
11-Jan 
2010 
3,212 4.5% 103.67 43.89 2.36 (8.40) 
10-Feb 
2010 
2,982 -7.2% 84.09 38.35 2.19 12.15 
14-Oct 
2010 
2,879 -3.5% 70.26 33.19 2.12 10.93 
30-Dec 
2011 
2,199 -23.6% 53.66 33.19 1.62 53.66 
     PME 7.96% 
                                                        
2 Index refers to closing index on the day. If the market is closed, the closest trading day is   
chosen. 
3 Unit is USD in millions except for "index", "index performance", “share numbers”, "IRR", and 
"PME".   
4 Numbers within brackets in the “Cash flow” column indicate cash out; on the contrary, numbers 
without brackets in the “Cash flow” column indicate cash in. 
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Table 14 PME Calculations for Shenzhen Composite Index 
Date 
Shenzhen Composite Index 
Index 
Index 
performance 
Theoretical 
investment       
(USD in mm) 
Shares 
number          
(in mm) 
Price per 
share                
(in USD) 
Cash flow      
(USD in 
mm) 
12-Apr 
2006 
345  40.00 40.00 1.00 (40.00) 
10-Sep 
2007 
1,479 328.7% 173.08 40.37 4.29 (1.60) 
8-Nov 
2007 
1,321 -10.7% 163.05 42.58 3.83 (8.46) 
20-Nov 
2007 
1,327 0.5% 163.81 42.59 3.85 (0.03) 
17-Dec 
2009 
1,168 -12.0% 142.43 42.07 3.39 1.76 
23-Dec 
2009 
1,127 -3.5% 131.83 40.36 3.27 5.60 
11-Jan 
2010 
1,189 5.5% 147.48 42.79 3.45 (8.40) 
10-Feb 
2010 
1,117 -6.1% 121.05 37.39 3.24 17.50 
14-Oct 
2010 
1,206 8.0% 113.11 32.36 3.50 17.59 
30-Dec 
2011 
866 -28.2% 81.22 32.36 2.51 81.22 
     PME 18.40% 
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Table 15 PME Calculations for SSE SME Composite Index 
Date 
SSE SME Composite 
Index 
Index 
performance 
Theoretical 
investment       
(USD in mm) 
Shares 
number          
(in mm) 
Price per 
share                
(in USD) 
Cash flow      
(USD in 
mm) 
12-Apr 
2006 
1,627  40.00 40.00 1.00 (40.00) 
10-Sep 
2007 
5,718 251.4% 142.18 40.46 3.51 (1.60) 
8-Nov 
2007 
5,169 -9.6% 136.99 43.12 3.18 (8.46) 
20-Nov 
2007 
5,257 1.7% 139.34 43.13 3.23 (0.03) 
17-Dec 
2009 
5,364 2.0% 140.44 42.60 3.30 1.73 
23-Dec 
2009 
5,255 -2.0% 131.98 40.86 3.23 5.61 
11-Jan 
2010 
5,591 6.4% 148.82 43.31 3.44 (8.40) 
10-Feb 
2010 
5,360 -4.1% 124.66 37.84 3.29 18.02 
14-Oct 
2010 
6,318 17.9% 127.16 32.75 3.88 19.78 
30-Dec 
2011 
4,295 -32.0% 86.44 32.75 2.64 86.44 
     PME 20.00% 
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Table 16 PME Calculations for Hang Seng Index 
Date 
Hang Seng Index 
Index 
Index 
performance 
Theoretical 
investment       
(USD in mm) 
Shares 
number          
(in mm) 
Price per 
share                
(in USD) 
Cash 
flow      
(USD in 
mm) 
12-Apr 
2006 
16,310  40.00 40.00 1.00 (40.00) 
10-Sep 
2007 
23,999 47.1% 60.46 41.09 1.47 (1.60) 
8-Nov 
2007 
28,760 19.8% 80.91 45.88 1.76 (8.46) 
20-Nov 
2007 
27,771 -3.4% 78.15 45.90 1.70 (0.03) 
17-Dec 
2009 
21,347 -23.1% 59.34 45.34 1.31 0.73 
23-Dec 
2009 
21,328 -0.1% 56.87 43.49 1.31 2.42 
11-Jan 
2010 
22,411 5.1% 68.16 49.61 1.37 (8.40) 
10-Feb 
2010 
19,922 -11.1% 52.94 43.34 1.22 7.65 
14-Oct 
2010 
23,852 19.7% 54.85 37.51 1.46 8.53 
30-Dec 
2011 
18,434 -22.7% 42.39 37.51 1.13 42.39 
     PME 1.23% 
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Table 17 PME Calculations for S&P 500 Index 
Date 
S&P 500 Index 
Index 
Index 
performance 
Theoretical 
investment       
(USD in mm) 
Shares 
number          
(in mm) 
Price per 
share                
(in USD) 
Cash 
flow      
(USD in 
mm) 
12-Apr 
2006 
1,288  40.00 40.00 1.00 (40.00) 
10-Sep 
2007 
1,451 12.7% 46.66 41.42 1.13 (1.60) 
8-Nov 
2007 
1,474 1.6% 55.86 48.81 1.14 (8.46) 
20-Nov 
2007 
1,439 -2.4% 54.56 48.83 1.12 (0.03) 
17-Dec 
2009 
1,096 -23.8% 41.05 48.24 0.85 0.51 
23-Dec 
2009 
1,120 2.2% 40.24 46.27 0.87 1.71 
11-Jan 
2010 
1,146 2.3% 49.57 55.71 0.89 (8.40) 
10-Feb 
2010 
1,068 -6.8% 40.36 48.68 0.83 5.83 
14-Oct 
2010 
1,173 9.8% 38.36 42.13 0.91 5.97 
30-Dec 
2011 
1,257 7.2% 41.11 42.13 0.98 41.11 
     PME -1.31% 
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Table 18 PME Calculations for Dow Jones Industrial Average 
Date 
Dow Jones Industrial Average 
Index 
Index 
perform
ance 
Theoretical 
investment       
(USD in 
mm) 
Shares 
number          
(in mm) 
Price per 
share                
(in USD) 
Cash 
flow      
(USD in 
mm) 
12-Apr 
2006 
11,129  40.00 40.00 1.00 (40.00) 
10-Sep 
2007 
13,127 18.0% 48.78 41.36 1.18 (1.60) 
8-Nov 
2007 
13,266 1.1% 57.76 48.45 1.19 (8.46) 
20-Nov 
2007 
13,010 -1.9% 56.67 48.47 1.17 (0.03) 
17-Dec 
2009 
10,308 -20.8% 44.35 47.88 0.93 0.55 
23-Dec 
2009 
10,466 1.5% 43.20 45.93 0.94 1.84 
11-Jan 
2010 
10,663 1.9% 52.41 54.70 0.96 (8.40) 
10-Feb 
2010 
10,038 -5.9% 43.11 47.79 0.90 6.23 
14-Oct 
2010 
11,096 10.5% 41.24 41.36 1.00 6.41 
30-Dec 
2011 
12,217 10.1% 45.40 41.36 1.10 45.40 
     PME 0.73% 
 
  
94 
Table 19 PME Calculations for NASDAQ Composite Index 
Date 
NASDAQ Composite Index 
Index 
Index 
performance 
Theoretical 
investment       
(USD in mm) 
Shares 
number          
(in mm) 
Price per 
share                
(in USD) 
Cash 
flow      
(USD in 
mm) 
12-Apr 
2006 
2,314  40.00 40.00 1.00 (40.00) 
10-Sep 
2007 
2,559 10.6% 45.84 41.45 1.11 (1.60) 
8-Nov 
2007 
2,696 5.4% 56.75 48.71 1.17 (8.46) 
20-Nov 
2007 
2,596 -3.7% 54.67 48.73 1.12 (0.03) 
17-Dec 
2009 
2,180 -16.0% 45.35 48.14 0.94 0.56 
23-Dec 
2009 
2,269 4.1% 45.28 46.17 0.98 1.92 
11-Jan 
2010 
2,312 1.9% 54.53 54.58 1.00 (8.40) 
10-Feb 
2010 
2,147 -7.1% 44.25 47.69 0.93 6.40 
14-Oct 
2010 
2,435 13.4% 43.43 41.27 1.05 6.75 
30-Dec 
2011 
2,605  7.0% 46.46 41.27 1.13 46.46 
     PME 1.33% 
Source: http://vip.stock.finance.sina.com.cn/mkt/
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FINANCIAL COMPARISON WITH INDUSTRY PEERS 
 
 
  
96 
Table 20 Financial Comparison with Publically Listed Competitors in China 
Financials                 
(RMB in 
mm) 
Year GMM 
ERA 
Mining5 
SANY 
INT'L5 
China 
Coal6 
Tiandi7 
Zhengzhou 
Coal8 
Revenue 
2007 858 138 N/A 3,525 3,287 2,358 
2008 1,280  1,108  1,147  4,634  4,979  3,722  
2009 1,520  1,405  1,901  5,949  6,600  5,160  
2010 1,943  1,769  2,683  7,071  7,969  5,631  
2011 2,098  1,953  3,780  8,129  12,009  6,525  
CAGR9 of 
Revenue  
 
2007- 
2011 
25.06% 93.91% 48.83% 23.23% 38.25% 28.98% 
Total Asset 
2007 1,790  429  N/A 3,476  3,996  2,456  
2008 2,159  994  3,122  5,223  6,835  3,737  
2009 2,205  1,635  5,459  7,202  8,507  4,753  
2010 3,775  3,381  5,883  9,238  10,560  8,117  
2011 4,147  5,662  7,466  11,285  13,966  9,026  
CAGR of 
Total Asset 
2007-
2011 
23.36% 90.56% 33.72% 34.23% 36.73% 38.46% 
        
        
        
        
                                                        
5 SANY INT'L stands for “Sany Heavy Equipment International Holdings Company Limited". 
6 China Coal stands for "China Coal Energy Company Limited". 
7 Tiandi stands for "Tiandi Science & Technology Co., Ltd." 
8 Zhengzhou Coal stands for "Zhengzhou Coal Mining Machinery Group Company Limited".  
9 CAGR means "Compound Annual Growth Rate". 
  
97 
Financials                 
(RMB in 
mm) 
Year GMM 
ERA 
Mining5 
SANY 
INT'L5 
China 
Coal6 
Tiandi7 
Zhengzhou 
Coal8 
Asset10 
Turnover  
2007 752  1,119  N/A 355  438  375  
2008 607  323  980  406  494  361  
2009 523  419  1,034  436  464  332  
2010 700  688  789  470  477  519  
2011 712  1,043  711  500  419  498  
EBIT11 
2007 142  11  N/A 300  576  372  
2008 188  92  245  342  1,016  445  
2009 296  177  524  453  1,215  676  
2010 428  215  726  553  1,445  979  
2011 444  129  884  655  1,973  1,204  
EBIT 
Margin 
2007 16.50% 8.16% N/A 8.51% 17.52% 15.78% 
2008 14.66% 8.27% 21.38% 7.38% 20.42% 11.96% 
2009 19.45% 12.62% 27.58% 7.61% 18.41% 13.10% 
2010 22.03% 12.14% 27.04% 7.82% 18.13% 17.39% 
2011 21.17% 6.59% 23.39% 8.05% 16.43% 18.46% 
CAGR of 
EBIT 
Margin 
2007-
2011 
6.42% -5.20% 3.04% -1.37% -1.60% 4.00% 
        
        
        
        
                                                        
10 Asset turnover=360*Total asset/revenue. 
11 EBIT=Gross profit - SG & A expenses.   
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Financials                 
(RMB in 
mm) 
Year GMM 
ERA 
Mining5 
SANY 
INT'L5 
China 
Coal6 
Tiandi7 
Zhengzhou 
Coal8 
EBIT/ 
Total Asset 
2007 7.90% 2.62% N/A 8.63% 14.41% 15.15% 
2008 8.69% 9.22% 7.85% 6.54% 14.87% 11.92% 
2009 13.40% 10.84% 9.60% 6.29% 14.28% 14.22% 
2010 11.34% 6.35% 12.33% 5.99% 13.68% 12.06% 
2011 10.71% 2.27% 11.84% 5.80% 14.13% 13.34% 
# of 
Employees 
2007 3,329 N/A N/A 8,883 4,412 N/A 
2008 3,640 N/A 2,431 7,994 6,344 N/A 
2009 3,397 2,409 3,045 9,454 8,767 N/A 
2010 3,675 3,165 3,625 9,522 9,718 3,533 
2011 3,718 3,836 4,958 9,341 10,613 3,344 
CAGR of # 
of 
Employees 
2007-
2011 
2.80% N/A 26.82% 1.26% 24.54% N/A 
EBIT per 
Person 
2007 42,514 N/A N/A 33,769 130,539 N/A 
2008 51,527 N/A 100,880 42,762 160,214 N/A 
2009 87,006 73,570 172,194 47,891 138,604 N/A 
2010 116,452 67,877 200,171 58,071 148,658 277,158 
2011 119,438 33,543 178,368 70,076 185,890 360,179 
CAGR12 of 
EBIT per 
Person 
2007-
2011 
29.47% N/A 20.93% 13.14% 9.24% N/A 
 
                                                        
12 Financials at SANY INT’L’s for 2007 is not available, therefore, CAGR calculation for SANY 
starts from 2008.  
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Table 21 Basic Information of the Interviewed Companies 
Firm13 Industry 
Investment 
size (US$ mm) 
Equity 
percentage 
Holding period 
(years) 
Exit 
method 
Investment rational 
TVM Media 25 100% 2 NA14 
Consolidate fast-growing cable TV ad 
market. 
LNM New material 1.55 10% 4 NA 
Develop new material for numerous 
industrial applications. 
TOG Oil/gas 400 100% 3 NA Catch China growth opportunities.  
TCP 
Cell phone 
maker 
60 100% 5 NA Asia growth opportunities. 
BHCS 
Healthcare 
service  
5 10% 4 NA 
China growth opportunities, leverage 
global network resources. 
BHCP 
Diagnosis  
product 
5 15% 4 NA Fast-growing sector and technology. 
BCT Refrigeration 4 15% 3 NA 
Fast-growing sector, bring needed 
technology. 
LQP Auto parts 4.8 10% 5 IPO15 New growth sector in China. 
LYJG Chemical 2.6 30% 5 IPO Import substitute opportunities. 
                                                        
13 Names of the companies are pseudonyms to protect the confidentiality of the interviewees. 
14 Investment is still in a holding period.  
15 Initial Public Offering (IPO), which includes listings at the newly created Third Board.  
10
0
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Firm13 Industry 
Investment 
size (US$ mm) 
Equity 
percentage 
Holding period 
(years) 
Exit 
method 
Investment rational 
LTS 
Cell phone 
parts 
5.7 7% 3 IPO 
Breakthrough technology, serving 
fast-moving consumer market. 
LBYQ 
Electric 
transformer 
1.9 5% 4 IPO Growth opportunity. 
LTBF Chemical 8.5 10% 3 RTO16 
Global expansion of the Chinese 
company. 
NXF 
Consumer 
products 
55 60% 5 T17 China growth. 
NQP Auto 52 30% 3 T 
Global auto parts making inroad to 
China, seeking growth. 
YTS Travel services 9.23 12% 4 NA Fast-growing consumer services. 
YRS 
Subway system 
design 
15.38 5% 2 NA Fast-growing subway system design. 
NDS TMT 20 5% 1 NA 
High-tech company, waiting for 
explosive growth opportunities. 
THW Hardware 105 70% 4 NA 
Roll-up strategy to consolidate 
hardware sourcing. 
 
 
                                                        
16 Reverse Tender Offer (RTO), the company sold itself to a public company. 
17 Trade Sale—the company is sold to another fund or corporate buyer. 
10
1 
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Table 22 Capabilities and Financial Performance     
Firm 
Control 
method 
Value-added activities 
provided by investors18. 
Typical quote Lessons learned 
Estimated 
investment 
return (IRR) 
TVM Full Financial/accounting 
legal compliance, 
corporate governance.  
Had we known the background 
of the CEO beforehand, we 
would not have invested in the 
company (fund partner). 
Due diligence was not 
properly done. Investor was 
rushed into deal. 
Negative 
LNM 
 
Veto Sales/marketing 
Industry network 
product and process 
expertise. 
Had wrong co-investor. We 
should not invest in a company 
in which we could not influence 
the decision-making process 
(fund partner). 
Should not co-invest with a 
SOE fund that does not share 
same vision and values. 
Negative 
TOG Full  Product development, 
quality assurance, 
finance/accounting. 
CEO is a big company guy, talks 
too much but lacks hands-on 
leadership (operating partner). 
Ignored product quality 
issue during due diligence. 
Overpaid for the company 
which leaves no cushion for 
market downturn. 
15% 
TCP Full None The company is a revolving 
door. Investor is not involved in 
the operation. There is no 
effective communication 
between investor and the 
management team (operation 
partner).  
TMT changed too many 
times since investment. CEO, 
CFO, and other key positions 
changed multiple times. As a 
result, the company is 
struggling in the market. 
Negative 
                                                        
18 This would include investors, co-investors, and outside experts brought in by investors. 
10
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Firm 
Control 
method 
Value-added activities 
provided by investors18. 
Typical quote Lessons learned 
Estimated 
investment 
return (IRR) 
BHCS Veto Sales/marketing, 
accounting and legal 
compliance. 
The company could not reach 
out to overseas customers due to 
communication issues (fund 
partner). 
For smaller companies, 
investors must pitch in and 
help get things right. 
22% 
BHCP Veto Technology transfer. Our co-investor would not come 
to invest in China if we are not 
in the deal (fund partner). 
Managing a small startup 
requires investors be 
prepared to provide a lot of 
value-added services. 
25% 
BCT Veto Sales/marketing, 
technology/product 
design, 
accounting/finance. 
Our co-investor sent in 
engineers to work side by side at 
the company to get the product 
design right (fund partner). 
With a fast-growing market, 
investors have to contribute 
value in addition to money. 
38% 
LQP Veto Strategy consulting. 
Sales/marketing, 
accounting support, 
business development, 
hiring. 
We work closely with the CEO, 
supporting him with whatever 
he needs (fund partner).  
Should focus on our core 
industry which we could add 
more value. 
32% 
LYJG Veto Industry network, 
sales/marketing, 
product certification, 
new business 
development, product 
and process expertise. 
We strongly recommend the 
CEO does not get into 
competition with its customers. 
Despite our advice, the company 
went to compete directly with its 
customers. As a result, it 
suffered a huge loss of revenue 
on its core products (fund 
partner). 
Should not invest into a 
startup because of its 
technical ability only. Should 
hire a strong COO with 
business training to 
complement the CEO. 
17% 
10
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Firm 
Control 
method 
Value-added activities 
provided by investors18. 
Typical quote Lessons learned 
Estimated 
investment 
return (IRR) 
 
LTS Veto Industry network, 
technology 
development, 
sales/marketing, 
improve core 
competency, 
differentiate its 
product offering. 
Founder/CEO is easy to work 
with. He appreciates the 
operational value we bring in 
addition to our investment. We 
consistently communicate on 
various business issues (fund 
partner). 
Investment into a business is 
ultimately investing into the 
entrepreneur and its team. 
36% 
LBYQ Veto None  The management team is 
strong. They do not need help 
from investors. We invested in 
the deal because it is a club deal 
situation. We are returning a 
favor to other co-investors (fund 
partner). 
This is a pre-IPO case. We 
did bring in co-investors to 
help the company develop 
new business opportunities. 
34% 
LTBF Veto Strategic consulting, 
global sales/marketing, 
expanding overseas 
customer base, help 
recruited industry 
experts, improve 
quality, cost reduction, 
waste re-utilization. 
Top management team is a 
capable one. However, they do 
not have a global vision or 
network resources to develop 
the business. This is where we 
provide help (fund partner). 
It is easy for companies to 
accept help if it is revenue 
enhancing. Cost-cutting 
initiatives are less welcome. 
Therefore, work on the 
enhancing revenue first to 
earn credibility. Implement 
cost-cutting measures to 
improve efficiency later. 
60%  
10
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Firm 
Control 
method 
Value-added activities 
provided by investors18. 
Typical quote Lessons learned 
Estimated 
investment 
return (IRR) 
NXF Full Operational support, 
finance/accounting. 
We were dragged into being a 
majority shareholder. 
Unexpected market changes 
made return below our 
expectation.   
When investments do not 
perform as expected, 
investors should get out 
earlier rather than later. 
13% 
NQP Partial Sales/marketing, new 
channel, recruiting key 
operation managers, 
assisting the sales 
process by vetting the 
potential Chinese 
buyer.  
We got into this deal because we 
like the market growth 
opportunity and our partner 
who is a global market leader in 
the field (fund partner). 
External support from 
industry experts is an 
important resource that can 
be utilized. 
45% 
NDS Veto Not much value added 
except on company 
direction. 
We invested into this company 
because we had previous success 
in a similar business (fund 
partner). 
Prior investment experience 
helped in selection of new 
investment project. 
23% 
THW Partial Investor tried to put in 
structures that would 
transform business 
from a family business 
to a professionally run 
one.  
The CEO hired by the investor is 
a big company guy, could not 
work well with a small company. 
Plus, his actions are always 
second-guessed by the minority 
shareholder (fund partner). 
Minority position is tricky.  
If shareholders do not share 
the same vision and ethics, 
the company will suffer.  
Negative 
YRS None Not much value-added 
services required and 
provided. 
The company does not want us 
to be involved in the operation. 
We can only provide soft 
consulting services (fund 
partner). 
As a financial investor, there 
is only so much an investor 
can do unless asked by the 
company. 
12% 
10
5
 
  
106 
Firm 
Control 
method 
Value-added activities 
provided by investors18. 
Typical quote Lessons learned 
Estimated 
investment 
return (IRR) 
 
YTS Veto Strategic consulting, 
recommend people for 
key positions, help on 
network expansion.   
We can only influence the 
company through board-level 
discussion (fund partner).  
Well-run businesses do not 
need to verify their business 
model. Choosing the right 
business is the key.  
43% 
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